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Preventative or Performative? Assessing the Role and Intention of the 
UK’s ‘Hostile Environment’ Since 2010 
Adam Weisz 
Since coming to power in 2010, the Conservative Party in the UK has been pursuing 
increasingly harsh policies tackling undocumented migration that have come to be 
collectively known as the ‘hostile environment.’ These policies seek to make life difficult 
for anyone living in the UK without regular status, by requiring documentation checks 
when accessing services such as healthcare, housing, employment, and so forth. The 
stated goal of the policies is both to encourage undocumented migrants present in the 
UK to leave, and to deter potential migrants from entering in the first place. By 
examining the manner in which such policies were designed and implemented, and 
critiquing the degree to which they were executed in a well-planned and methodical 
way, this thesis seeks to question the extent to which migrants themselves were the 
target audience of the hostile environment.  It instead suggests that the hostile 
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Preventative or Performative? 
Assessing the Role and Intention of the 
UK’s ‘Hostile Environment’ Since 2010 
1. Introduction 
“The aim is to create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal migration.”1 
These words, spoken in 2012 by then-Home Secretary Theresa May, have come to 
define the comprehensive, holistic immigration policy that has been steadily forming 
since the Conservatives took power in the UK in 2010 as the largest party in a coalition 
government. In the eight years since, the Conservatives have adopted a series of 
measures that have sought to curb immigration by ensuring that “migrants do not face 
border officials only when they enter the country for the first time, but as a constant part 
of daily life.”2  
Today, anyone living in the UK can expect to face documentation checks should 
they try to apply for a job, rent property, access non-emergency NHS treatment, apply 
for a driving license, open a bank account, and much more; the point being that those 
without regular status will be denied access to these services. As Theresa May told BBC’s 
                                               
1 James Kirkup and Robert Winnett, “Theresa May interview: 'We’re going to give illegal migrants a really 
hostile reception’,” The Telegraph, 25 May 2012, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9291483/Theresa-May-interview-Were-going-
to-give-illegal-migrants-a-really-hostile-reception.html. Emphasis added. 





The Today programme in 2013, “What we don’t want is a situation where people think 
that they can come here and overstay because they’re able to access everything they 
need.”3 This highlights the twofold logic of this ‘hostile environment’: First, to make the 
lives of those already present in the UK so unbearable that they will ‘voluntarily’ return 
to their country of origin. Second, to act as a deterrent- to affect the decision of those 
still outside of the UK who might otherwise come, or overstay their visa.  
While I will address both aspects of the hostile environment, it is the deterrent 
nature that will form the main focus of my study. I do this for several reasons. Firstly, in 
the short term the hostile environment obviously seeks to both discourage immigration 
and encourage emigration. But in theory, once all undocumented migrants currently in 
the UK have left, then the long-term role of the hostile environment will be to 
discourage further immigration.  
Second, the national discourse around the hostile environment has focused on 
those already present in the UK, to the detriment of exploring several important human 
rights-related issues for those yet to arrive. The lack of focus on the hostile environment 
as an instrument of deterrence is worrying, given that deterrence is a key reason for its 
instigation. In 2013, immigration minister James Brokenshire said that the newly 
announced Immigration Bill4 had “two purposes”- “One was to attract those who wanted 
to come and to contribute, and the other was to deter those who did not.”5 When the 
                                               
3 Alan Travis, “Immigration bill: Theresa May defends plans to create 'hostile environment',” The 
Guardian, 10 October 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/10/immigration-bill-
theresa-may-hostile-environment 
4 This would go on to become the Immigration Act 2014. 




House of Commons was debating what would become the Immigration Act 2016, 
Theresa May argued that the reason more restrictions on illegal working was necessary 
was that it “remains one of the principal pull factors for people coming to live in the UK 
illegally.”6 However, it will be pertinent to remember that the hostile environment seeks 
to serve a dual role- inducing emigration as well as reducing immigration- and I will as 
far as possible accommodate this into my analysis. 
*** 
Since the era of Margaret Thatcher’s radical neoliberalisation of the British 
political landscape, the Conservative party has tread a careful line between economic 
liberalism and social conservatism, and this is especially apparent in the area of 
immigration.7 The Thatcherite conception of market liberalisation would ordinarily be 
taken to include recognition of the economic benefits of free movement, however 
regular attempts have been made to promote policies restricting mass migration in 
order to appeal to a socially conservative base.8 Tony Blair’s Labour government in the 
2000s, while taking some policy positions hostile to immigration, consistently 
emphasised the macroeconomic and cultural value that migrants could bring to the UK.9 
                                               
22/debates/13102256000001/ImmigrationControls?highlight=deter%20immigration#contribution-
13102257000005, Column 22WH.  
6 House of Commons, “Debate on the Immigration Bill 2015, Third Reading,” Hansard, Volume 603, 1 
December 2015, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-12-
01/debates/15120141000002/ImmigrationBill?highlight=immigration%20bill#contribution-
15120151001264, Column 268.  
7 Julie Smith, “Towards consensus? Centre-right parties and immigration policy in the UK and Ireland,” 
Journal of European Public Policy, 15:3 (2008):415-431, DOI: 10.1080/13501760701847689, 420. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Myriam Cherti, “The Policy Framework for Immigration Enforcement in the UK,” Does Immigration 
Enforcement Matter (DIEM)? Irregular Immigrants and Control Policies in the UK, Centre on 
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The Conservatives in opposition, therefore, presented themselves as a contrast, carving 
out a niche as the party that took voters’ concerns about immigration seriously.10   
However, the rise of the anti-immigration United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) from the late 2000s onwards posed a considerable threat to the Conservative 
party’s vote, demonstrated through strong showings at the European Parliamentary 
elections,11 a number of high-profile defections from the Conservatives to UKIP,12 and a 
2013 poll showing that nearly 30% of Conservative Party members identified as being 
likely to vote UKIP.13 By 2013, 77% of the British public were in favour of reducing 
immigration to some extent.14 Thus, concurrent needs to both distinguish themselves 
from more socially liberal opposition parties, and to stave off encroachment from the far 
right, have led to the Conservatives making policy pledges in order to show that they are 
willing to be tough on immigration.15  
Often this has formed the basis of electoral platforms. In 2010, the Conservatives 
famously promised to “take net migration back to the levels of the 1990s – tens of 
                                               
Migration Policy and Society, Project Report 4, November 2014. 
https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/media/PR-2014-DIEM_Policy_Framework.pdf, 3. 
10 Smith, “Towards consensus?”, 423. 
11 BBC News, “Vote 2014: UK European election results,” Accessed 30 July 2018, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/vote2014/eu-uk-results.  
12 Rebecca Partos, “No immigrants, no evidence? The making of Conservative Party immigration policy,” 
Political Insight 5, Issue 3, (December 2014): 12-15, 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/2041-9066.12068, 14.  
13 Tim Bale and Paul Webb, “Why Do Tories Defect to UKIP? Conservative Party Members and the 
Temptations of the Populist Radical Right,” Political Studies 62, (2014): 961–970, 964.  
14 Scott Blinder and William Allen, “UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level 
of Concern,” The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, 28 November 2016, 
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-immigration-
overall-attitudes-and-level-of-concern/. 
15 Partos, “No immigrants, no evidence?,” 14.  
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thousands a year, not hundreds of thousands”,16 while in 2015 they reaffirmed this 
commitment to reduce net migration, stressed their existing successes in immigration 
control, and vowed “to strengthen our borders, improve the enforcement of our 
immigration laws and act to make sure people leave at the end of their visas.”17 To a 
large extent, then, the hostile environment is a realisation and delivery of electoral 
pledges. One former Liberal Democrat special advisor told me that the Tories’ 
immigration policy was “150%” influenced by vote winning, with very few in the Cabinet 
believing that the ‘tens of thousands’ target could be met through hostile environment 
measures.18 
That parties adopt policies to win votes seems almost trivially true. The 
responsiveness of political leaders to public opinion shifts is well documented.19 But 
parties also have distinct ideological identities that can constrain them in the set of 
possible policies they choose to adopt, regardless of how popular they would be: For 
example, it seems extremely unlikely that the Green Party would propose expansion of 
Britain’s coal mining industry, regardless of where public opinion lay. In political 
science scholarship, parties’ motivations are often characterised as either office-seeking 
(parties compete to win outright power), policy-seeking (parties compete to advance 
their own prefixed agenda), or vote-seeking (parties compete to win the support of the 
                                               
16 The Conservative Party, “Invitation to Join the Government of Britain – The Conservative Manifesto 
2010,” 2010, 21. 
17 The Conservative Party, “Strong Leadership, A Clear Economic Plan, A Brighter, More Secure Future- 
The Conservative Manifesto 2015”, 2015, 29-30. 
18 Interview with former Lib Dem Special Advisor, 29 June 2018.  
19 Robert Erikson, Michael Mackuen and James Stimson, The Macro Polity, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 339.  
 6 
 
electorate).20 However, rather than these being distinct conceptual frameworks, Müller 
and Strøm argue that they should be interpreted as competing and overlapping 
priorities, with leaders regularly being expected to find a compromise between a party’s 
broad ideological commitments, and implementing policies that would provide electoral 
success.21 We have seen both ends of this in the current Conservative government: First, 
during his tenure as Prime Minister, David Cameron offered a referendum on Britain’s 
membership of the EU as part of the Conservative’s 2015 electoral platform,22 largely to 
win votes off UKIP, despite his own personal ideological preferences being staunchly 
pro-European.23 On the other hand, in the run-up to the 2017 general election, Theresa 
May promised to ring-fence the foreign aid budget for ideological reasons, despite the 
fact that diverting it to domestic public services would have proved popular with the 
public.24 With regards to the hostile environment, then, the challenge lies in deciding 
where on the spectrum these policies lie: To what extent is the primary policy aim to 
limit immigration, and to what extent are these policies a strategic move to win votes? 
Obviously, without being able to read the minds of those in power making policy 
decisions, we cannot answer this question definitively. And in the sphere of 
                                               
20 Wolfgang C Müller and Kaare Strøm, Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe 
Make Hard Decisions, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1999), 7. 
21 Ibid, 12. 
22 The Conservative Party, “The Conservative Manifesto 2015,” 30. 
23 Heather Stewart, Anushka Asthana and Rowena Mason, “David Cameron on EU referendum: let us not 
roll the dice on our children's future,” The Guardian, 3 June 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/02/david-cameron-eu-let-us-not-roll-the-dice-on-our-
childrens-future. 
24 Anushka Asthana, “May to resist pressure to cut Britain's foreign aid commitment,” The Guardian, 12 
February 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/feb/12/theresa-may-committed-uk-foreign-
aid-spending-pledge-oxfam; 
Giles Sheldrick, “Eight in ten Brits demand the Government use bloated foreign aid budget to help the 




policymaking, where multiple actors collaborate, multiple interests intersect, and 
multiple priorities compete, it is difficult to draw a sharp and precise answer. 
Nevertheless, in this thesis, I shall argue that the primary aim of the hostile 
environment policies is to appeal to domestic public opinion, rather than pursuing the 
goal of deterrence (or encouraging emigration). This is not to say that the goal of 
deterrence is irrelevant, nor that the government does not care at all about reducing net 
migration (indeed, it may be important to them), merely that those objectives are 
subordinate to the aim of courting public opinion. 
My argument will not take the form of a neat, deductive, logical proof, deriving 
indubitable conclusions from undeniable premises. Instead, I will look to build my case 
holistically, with mutually reinforcing propositions working together to build an 
argument comprehensively.25 I do not presuppose that any one point, or any point taken 
in isolation, will definitively prove my hypothesis, but I hope that the combined weight 
of these elements will be convincing. 
The points I will be making to argue for this hypothesis are as follows: 
● Many of the hostile environment policies are not new, and are mainly 
extensions of (or in some cases, reversions to) old UK government policy, 
demonstrating that in some cases, the ‘hostile environment’ is more an 
exercise in PR than a substantive new policy direction; 
                                               
25 Ernest Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge,” 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, Vol 1 (1980):3-26. 
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● The Conservatives’ main immigration pledge is to reduce net migration to the 
tens of thousands. By definition, this target cannot include undocumented 
migrant numbers, which are unmeasurable. There is no real standard of 
success for the hostile environment policy, which I will argue is indicative of 
‘symbolic policy making’ as opposed to comprehensive, well-planned political 
strategy;  
● Migration patterns to the UK, as well as what we know about the situations, 
attitudes, and motivations of those who stay in the UK with undocumented 
status, suggest that the policies adopted by the Home Office are unlikely to 
deter entry or induce emigration. The fact that the government chooses to 
enact the hostile environment anyway, implies an ulterior motive to the 
policy; 
●  The information pathways from the Home Office to those outside the UK are 
at worst non-existent, and at best inadequate. If the policies’ target audience 
is unaware of their existence, they cannot reasonably be expected to be 
deterred, casting doubt on the notion that this is the policies’ primary aim. 
As previously noted, these points, taken in isolation, may seem unremarkable, 
but when considered collectively imply a political environment in which the public 
image aspect of the policy takes precedence over its objective outcome. I begin by 
outlining the hostile environment and who it affects. I then consider the human rights 
implications of the hostile environment, and why my research has importance within 
this field. I then seek to outline a conceptual framework and theory of analysis, by which 
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I will determine how to judge the role and intention of the policies. I will then analyse 
the hostile environment against this framework, using the arguments outlined above, to 
determine the role and intention of the hostile environment. I will conclude that while 
reducing migration in general and irregular migration in particular seems to be a 
legitimate goal of the British government, there is a large extent to which public 
perception of the policies is deemed more important, implying that the intended target 
audience is domestic voters holding anti-immigration views.  
 
2. Methodology 
This study primarily consisted of desk review of various primary and secondary 
resources. This included academic and scholarly works, studies and reports by third 
sector and governmental organisations, analysis of primary legislation and executive 
orders, and grey literature analysis. 
I supplemented this with qualitative interviews, in order to obtain additional 
insights not covered in the literature or to expand on relevant themes. I interviewed 
eight former or current undocumented migrants regarding their experience of the 
hostile environment, their motivations for coming to the UK, and their awareness about 
deterrence provisions prior to arrival. I also interviewed one former civil servant, one 
former communications expert in the coalition government, and one author and former 
Liberal Democrat staffer, who together provided insights regarding the operations of 
government and the Coalition government in particular. I was unable to secure 
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interviews with current or former government ministers, a failure which constitutes a 
limitation in the extent to which strong conclusions can be drawn from my findings.  
I conducted social media analysis of foreign embassy Facebook pages: I include a 
more thorough methodology of this process in Chapter 10.1.  
I attempted to make a request for information on current information campaigns 
under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Unfortunately, due to administrative 
issues outside of my control, the request will not be answered until after the publication 
date of this thesis. Again, this represents a limitation in my research. I discuss this 
limitation in more depth in Chapter 10.  
 
 
3. What Is The Hostile Environment And Whom Does It 
Affect? 
3.1 The development of the hostile environment 
The concept of ‘undocumented migration’ did not really emerge until the 1920s 
and 30s, as states began to create official legal frameworks around entering and exiting 
their territory- Prior to this, movement between countries had been fairly free and 
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unregulated.26 In the 1980s and 90s new legal regimes emerged that sought to 
“criminalise” certain forms of migration.27 Thus, as Düvell puts it, “clandestine 
migration is not an independent social phenomenon; it exists only because it is socially, 
politically and legally constructed.”28 The hostile environment therefore is part of a 
wider global trend over the past three decades, that seeks to criminalise, punish, and 
remove those determined to have no right to be in a given territory.  
While it has become Theresa May’s flagship immigration policy, she did not 
invent the phrase “hostile environment.”. In 2009, Labour’s Alan Ball (then Home 
Secretary) used it in a speech, and a Home Office report from February 2010 (while 
Labour was still in power) called to “make the UK a hostile environment for those that 
seek to break our laws or abuse our hospitality.”29 What May did (first as Home 
Secretary from 2010 until 2016, and thereafter as Prime Minister) was to pivot this from 
a throwaway remark, into the main focus of government policy. The hostile environment 
is just that- an environment- and it is not limited to statutory legislation, but also 
encompasses executive instruction, enforcement campaigns, public relations campaigns, 
and so forth.  
                                               
26 Katherine Donato and Douglas Massey, “Twenty-First Century Globalization And Illegal Migration,” 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 666, No. 1 (14 June 2016): 7-26, 
9; 
Franck Düvell, “Clandestine migration in Europe,” Social Science Information, Vol. 47, No. 4 (1 December 
2008): 479 – 497, 480. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Düvell, “Clandestine migration in Europe,” 480. 
29 Natasha Clark, “Whose Fault? Labour were first to suggest ‘hostile environment’ for immigrants, Emily 





The main legislative teeth of the hostile environment come from the Immigration 
Acts 2014 and 2016. These expansive pieces of legislation contain many provisions 
designed to make life difficult for undocumented migrants, including: 
● Introducing civil penalties for landlords who rent premises to 
anybody without first checking their immigration status and “right to rent”.30 
This “right to rent” scheme was later extended in the 2016 Act to make it a 
criminal offence for a landlord to rent to an individual if he or she “knows or has 
reasonable cause to believe” that the individual has no documented status in the 
UK;31 
● Charging those without regular status in the UK to use NHS 
services32 (although it must be noted that this is a realisation of powers 
previously granted in the National Health Service Act 2006).33 The Department 
of Health adopted the Overseas Charging Regulations in 2015 which, along with 
various additional orders over time, have mandated NHS staff to determine 
eligibility for treatment through documentation checks and implement 
appropriate charges, or even refuse treatment in some circumstances;34 
● Forbidding banks from opening accounts for new customers 
without checking that the person has appropriate status in the UK;35 
                                               
30 UK Parliament, “Immigration Act 2014,” Chapter 1 
31 UK Parliament, “Immigration Act 2016”, Section 33A(3) 
32 Immigration Act 2014, Section 39 
33 UK Parliament, “National Health Service Act 2006,” Section 175. 
34 Department of Health, “Guidance on implementing the overseas visitor charging regulations,” Internal 
DoH memo, May 2018, various pages. 
35 Immigration Act 2014, Section 40. 
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● Creating a new criminal offence of “illegal working” and lowering 
the bar for an employer to face criminal sanctions (while also raising the 
maximum prison sentence for employing someone without legal status): Whereas 
before an employer had to be aware that a worker had no documented status in 
order to face penalties, now they just have to have “reasonable cause”, forcing 
employers to be more stringent with documentation checks;36 
● Making it a criminal offence to drive a vehicle without legal status 
in the UK.37 
This list is by no means comprehensive, but as we can see, the main thrust of the 
hostile environment concerns creating or expanding incentives for private citizens to 
take on the role of immigration enforcement, denying services to those deemed to be in 
the UK irregularly. On top of this, an unwelcoming, hostile environment has been 
created by high-profile enforcement campaigns (such as the infamous “Go Home” vans, 
which served little effect other than to instil fear into migrants at great financial cost to 
the Home Office)38, introducing a “deport first, appeal later” policy to restrict migrant’s 
rights to due process (which was overturned by the Supreme Court),39 as well as 
increasing application fees and restricting appeal rights to make it more difficult for 
migrants to regularise their stay in the UK.40 The hostile environment, then, is not 
                                               
36 Immigration Act 2016, Chapter 2. 
37 Immigration Act 2016, Section 43. 
38 Alan Travis, “'Go home' vans resulted in 11 people leaving Britain, says report,” The Guardian, 31 
October 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/31/go-home-vans-11-leave-britain. 
39 BBC News, “'Deport first, appeal later' policy ruled unlawful,” 14 June 2017, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40272323. 
40 Colin Yeo, “Above-inflation increase in immigration and nationality fees for 2018/19,” Free Movement, 
4 April 2018, https://www.freemovement.org.uk/increase-immigration-nationality-application-fees-
2018-19/; 
Colin Yeo, “Fees for EU nationals and others appealing immigration decisions increase over 500% today,” 
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merely a collection of legislative restrictions that aim to stop undocumented migrants at 
various points of their journey into and within the UK, but rather an attempt to create a 
more insidious and extensive atmosphere of hostility, inhospitality, and division, 
making the UK simply an unpleasant place to live for these groups, and so deterring 
people from coming or inducing those present to leave.  
 
3.2 “A hostile environment for all racial communities in the UK”? Who 
is affected by the hostile environment? 
The hostile environment is aimed first and foremost at undocumented migrants, 
although its reach goes much further. “Undocumented migrants” are not a uniform 
category- rather it is a heterogeneous group comprising many different types of migrant. 
Papademetriou distinguishes four main categories of undocumented migrants:41  
1. Undocumented or unauthorised entrants: Migrants who enter a 
territory clandestinely, that is, without detection or inspection by a border agent. 
In the context of the UK, this would include migrants who enter in the backs of 
lorries, or those who enter via the land border with Ireland.  
2. Fraudulent entrants: Individuals who are inspected upon entry into 
another state, but gain admission by using fraudulent documents (for example, a 
                                               
Free Movement, 10 October 2016, https://www.freemovement.org.uk/government-confirms-fees-
immigration-tribunal-hearings-will-skyrocket/. 
41 Demetrios G. Papademetriou, “The Global Struggle with Illegal Migration: No End in Sight,” Migration 




fake passport). They differ from unauthorised entrants in that they are subject to 
detection and inspection by a border agent, but the possession of a fraudulent 
document enables their entry.  
3. Visa overstayers: Migrants who entered on a valid visa, but did not 
leave the country when the visa expired. 
4. Visa violators: Migrants who hold a valid and unexpired visa, but 
have violated its terms. For example, someone in possession of a student visa 
who exceeds the number of hours that they are allowed to work per week.  
Additionally, Finch and Cherti, drawing on Papademetriou, identify ‘refused 
asylum seekers’ as a fifth category.42 However, it must be noted that many of these 
categories may overlap: For example, many asylum seekers will have originally entered 
the country either clandestinely or with fraudulent documents. In terms of the way they 
are treated by and experience the immigration system though, it is perhaps analytically 
useful to treat them as distinct. 
But while the hostile environment may be aimed ostensibly at undocumented 
migrants, its measures have further reach.  In 2018, Tendayi Achiume, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Racism, visited the UK, and was damning in her assessment of the 
hostile environment. She observed that “a hostile environment ostensibly created for, 
and formally restricted to, irregular immigrants is, in effect, a hostile environment for 
                                               
42 Myriam Cherti and Tim Finch, “No Easy Options: Irregular Immigration in the UK,” Institute for Public 
Policy Research, April 2011, 
https://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2011/05/No%20Easy%20Options%20Apr20
11_1837.pdf, 25.  
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all racial and ethnic communities and individuals in the UK.”43 She argues that any 
policy that forces private citizens to take on immigration enforcement roles encourages 
a culture of suspicion against anyone perceived to be in the country irregularly, and this 
suspicion disproportionately falls on racial and ethnic minorities: In essence, the hostile 
environment necessitates and promotes racial profiling not just by government officials, 
but the public at large. 
The recent “Windrush Scandal” is a case in point. In 2018 it emerged that 
migrants who had come to the UK from former colonies after the Second World War, 
were being denied basic services and even facing deportation, despite having legal status 
(although many, having been in the UK as long as 50 years, did not have the 
documentation to prove it).44 Similarly, the campaign group the Joint Council for the 
Welfare of Immigrants found that nearly half of landlords admitted that they would 
now be less likely to rent to non-EU nationals.45 Additionally, in a ‘mystery shopper’ 
scenario (in which researchers from various demographic groups applied for housing 
from private landlords), BME British citizens without a passport were 14% less likely to 
be given a property than white British citizens also without a passport- a result not 
replicated in a scenario where both applicants had passports:46 This demonstrates that 
                                               
43 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “End of Mission Statement of the Special 
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance at the Conclusion of Her Mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland,” Accessed 8 July 2018, 
https://ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23073&LangID=E 
44 Elgot, “Theresa May's 'hostile environment' at heart of Windrush scandal.” 
45 Chai Patel and Charlotte Peel, “Passport Please: The impact of the Right to Rent checks on migrants and 






the discrimination faced results directly from the checks necessitated by the ‘Right to 
Rent’ scheme. These cases are a clear vindication of Achiume’s warning, that a policy 
that forces the conduct of immigration enforcement out of the hands of border control 
agents will harm any minority group who do not immediately appear “native” enough to 
the privileged majority. 
The hostile environment has been criticised by opposition MPs, parliamentary 
select committees, civil society actors, charities, UN organisations, and even NHS staff 
who have to implement the policies, with criticism ranging from: the fact it leads to 
human rights violations; the fact that it creates an atmosphere of suspicion against 
minorities (even those with a right to remain); the fact that it forces private citizens to 
abandon their duty of care or take up extra work outside of their contracts; and the fact 
that as a policy it seems to lack direction, purpose, regulation, and oversight.47 
It must however be noted that the hostile environment remains popular with the 
public at large. Despite public opinion being critical of the government’s handling of the 
Windrush Scandal, 82% of Brits still support policies requiring migrants to prove their 
legal status in order to get a job, 79% believe one should have to do so to register with a 
                                               
47 See for example: Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “Concluding observations on the 
sixth periodic report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” United Nations, 
E/C.12/GBR/CO/6, 14 July 2016, paragraphs 55-56; 
Peter Walker, “Labour would end ‘hostile environment’ policy, says Abbott,” The Guardian, 16 May 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/16/labour-would-end-hostile-environment-
immigration-policy-says-abbott-yarls-wood-brook-house; 
Fabien Cante, “Cross-party parliamentary committee strongly critical of ‘hostile environment’,” Migrants 
Rights Network, 16 January 2018, https://migrantsrights.org.uk/blog/2018/01/16/cross-party-
parliamentary-committee-strongly-critical-hostile-environment/; 
Denis Campbell and Patrick Butler, “NHS staff and managers condemn 'passport before treatment' plan,” 




GP, 76% agree in the case of opening a bank account, and 74% think it should be a 
requirement for renting property.48 On a more general level, 71% of the public support 
the hostile environment in principle, with just 15% against it.49 
As a final caveat, many have interpreted the hostile environment to include 
policies that make life difficult for all migrants50 (such as the aforementioned raising of 
legal barriers to appeal decisions, even for legal channels of migration), acting as a 
deterrent even to EU citizens and regular migrants, and thus lowering the net migration 
figures. While there is certainly merit in this interpretation, and given the broad scope 
and holistic nature of the hostile environment it seems an inevitability that it will target 
all categories of migrant, the narrower focus of my thesis, as well as the way that senior 
government figures such as May have identified and described the hostile environment 
themselves, means that I shall be directing my focus purely on those policies that 
address undocumented migration.  
 
                                               
48 Anthony Wells, “Where the public stands on immigration,” YouGov, 27 April 2018, 
https://yougov.co.uk/news/2018/04/27/where-public-stands-immigration/. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See, for example: Robert Wright, “Call to scrap ‘hostile environment policy’ towards immigrants,” 
Financial Times, 2 July 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/09da22ce-7deb-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d. 
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4. The Hostile Environment as a Human Rights Issue 
4.1 The Hostile Environment as a Breach of International Law 
In July of 2016, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) published the results of their sixth periodic report on the United Kingdom. In 
this report, they criticised the British government for hostile environment policies that 
denied undocumented migrants access to basic healthcare,51 directly contravening 
obligations under, among other international instruments, Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,52 and Article 28 of 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers, 
which explicitly states that treatment “shall not be refused [to migrants] by reason of 
any irregularity with regard to stay or employment.”53 The hostile environment’s 
provisions also contravene internationally legally mandated rights to work and housing, 
among others.54  
As previously mentioned, the hostile environment has been criticised by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Racism, as well as civil society groups, for its disproportionate 
profiling of racial and ethnic minorities. The hostile environment therefore contravenes 
                                               
51 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “Concluding observations on the sixth periodic 
report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” paragraphs 55-56. 
52 The UN General Assembly, “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976, Article 12. 
53 UN General Assembly, “International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families,” General Assembly resolution 45/158, 18 December 1990, 
Article 28. 
54 ICESCR, Articles 6 and 11 
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multiple provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, in which states parties pledge not just to promote racial equality, 
but to enact laws that promote racial tolerance and repeal laws that foster division and 
discriminatory attitudes in the public: “to encourage...means of eliminating barriers 
between races, and to discourage anything which tends to strengthen racial division.”55 
Additionally, as we will see in Chapter 9, for many individuals, they are either 
unable to return home due to violence or persecution, or unwilling due to having an 
established life and strong family and cultural ties in the UK. Therefore the hostile 
environment puts undocumented migrants in a no-win situation: Either leave the UK 
and sacrifice their right to asylum56 or family life57, or else choose to live subject to what 
many would describe as “degrading treatment”,58 including the limitations on the right 
to work and healthcare rights listed previously.  
 
                                               
55 UN General Assembly, “International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination,” General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX), 21 December 1965, entry into force 4 January 
1969, Article 2. 
56 UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees”, United Nations, Treaty Series, 
Volume 189, 28 July 1951, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html. 
57 Council of Europe, “European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14,” 4 November 1950, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html, Article 8. 
58 Ibid, Article 3. 
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4.2 The Hostile Environment and Deterrence: Informed Choice and 
Migrant Agency 
Where the discourse around the human rights implications of the hostile 
environment becomes especially prescient is given the rise of what Gammeltoft-Hansen 
and Tan call the “deterrence paradigm.”59 While their discussion centres specifically on 
the notion of forced migration and asylum, it surely has relevance to the broader issue of 
irregular migration more generally- Indeed, Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi note that 
due to the nature of mixed migration flows, “preventive strategies equally affect 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers. Differentiation in policies only exists for those 
lucky few who succeed in crossing [borders] and seeking protection”.60  
The deterrence paradigm is the trend in global politics whereby states reaffirm 
their commitment to human rights norms publicly (in this case, emphasising 
individuals’ de jure right to claim asylum), while enacting legislation that effectively 
restricts that right de facto.61 This may take the form of provisions that prevent physical 
entry into a territory (such as erecting a wall or enforcing carrier sanctions), or they may 
take the form of provisions that make a particular state unappealing to migrants, 
whether that be in absolute terms or relative to neighbouring states (such as reducing 
financial assistance to asylum seekers, or reducing application success rates). Either 
                                               
59 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nikolas Feith Tan, “Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm in Global 
Refugee Policy,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review 39, No. 3 (2016): 637-649. 
60 Anna Triandafyllidou and Angeliki Dimitriadi, “Deterrence and Protection in the EU’s Migration 
Policy,” The International Spectator 49, No. 4 (2014): 146-162, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2014.95628, 
149. 
61 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan, “Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm in Global Refugee Policy.” 
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way, the logic is that if a state manages to stop an asylum seeker before they have set 
foot on their soil (or ‘convinces’ them to leave ‘voluntarily’ before their claim is 
accepted), then they avoid breaching the norm of non-refoulement. Non-refoulement is 
the international legal principle most famously elucidated in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, which forbids states from “expel[ling] or return[ing] a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.”62 The deterrence paradigm seeks to circumvent a 
state’s legal obligations: After all, an asylum seeker cannot be ‘refouled’ if they were 
never under the protection or jurisdiction of the receiving state to begin with; Likewise, 
if they leave voluntarily, then the receiving state is not responsible for whatever may 
happen, as that individual has essentially ‘chosen’ to refoule themselves.   
There are both direct and indirect links here to the hostile environment. On a 
basic level, within the refugee regime, the hostile environment forms part of the UK’s 
asylum deterrence system: Once one’s case has been refused and one’s appeal rights 
exhausted, the hostile environment awaits. The government hopes that for many asylum 
seekers, especially those it deems to be making spurious claims, the risk of one’s case 
failing and oneself subsequently falling into this destitution will put many off coming in 
the first place.  
For those asylum seekers already present within the UK, the hostile environment 
presents an additional human rights concern. While the principle of non-refoulement 
                                               
62 UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” Article 33.  
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ceases to apply if an asylum seeker repatriates themselves, this repatriation must be 
voluntary: A state violates an asylum seeker’s human rights if it pushes or pressures 
them to seek repatriation even if their life would be at risk.63 As discussed previously, 
part of the logic of the hostile environment is to induce those present in the UK to return 
to their countries of origin. Where this pressure applies to asylum seekers, the UK may 
be in breach of its international human rights obligations. While the main thrust of this 
thesis will be the deterrent nature of the hostile environment, it is worth remembering 
the myriad ways in which this policy affects lives of different individuals.  
Beyond this though, it is important to realise that an inherent component in the 
logic of the deterrence paradigm, not just in the realm of asylum, but in all aspects of 
migration deterrence, is that in theory its provisions should never be realised. Or rather, 
deterrence policies involve creating a threat, a threat that those behind the policies hope 
will dissuade a target from performing an undesirable action before it ever needs to be 
used.  
Consider the way that states stockpile nuclear weapons. Countries such as the US 
amass vast nuclear arsenals, in the hope of deterring potential aggressors (for example, 
North Korea) from instigating an unprovoked strike. While the US possesses the means 
to inflict severe harm on North Korea, its leaders argued that it is not their intention to 
actually use the nuclear weapons: They merely exist to discourage undesirable 
behaviour, and indeed, should they ever need to be used, it would purely be because 
                                               
63 Jerry Vang, “Limitations Of The Customary International Principle Of Non-refoulement On Non-party 
States: Thailand Repatriates The Remaining Hmong-lao Regardless Of International Norms,” Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 32, No. 2 (2014): 355–383, 373. 
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North Korea had acted first- in this instance, the US would not be at fault. North Korea 
knows the risks, knows what they need to do to avoid the risks, and therefore if they still 
choose to strike unilaterally, then the US can claim they have a legitimate right to 
retaliate without blame. 
Similarly, the logic of deterrence policies is that they are there to do just that: to 
deter. In theory their provisions should never be executed, and if they are, then it is the 
fault of the migrant who has chosen to display the undesirable behaviour (entering the 
territory) that such the policy was implemented to prevent.  
Why is this a human rights issue? Allowing anyone to experience destitution 
would ordinarily be a breach of a state’s human rights obligations, but countries like the 
UK maintain that if someone has no legal status in their territory, then the way they 
should avoid destitution is not by receiving host state support, but by returning to their 
country of origin- a failure to do so represents a choice on the individual’s part, and 
absolves the state of its rights obligations64 (in much the same way that the US could try 
to argue that if North Korea attacks first, then they have chosen to risk the consequences 
of a US nuclear strike). By extension, although the hostile environment may necessitate 
severe breaches of its victims’ human rights, then according to this logic those who 
suffer its effects have the potential to avoid this pain by leaving the UK voluntarily and 
returning to their country of origin to access services legally.65 Concurrently, as a 
                                               
64 “R (W) v Croydon LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 266”, and “R(Kimani) v Lambeth LBC [2003] EWCA Civ 
1150”, both cited in: UK Home Office, “Asylum support, section 4(2): policy and process,” 16 February 
2018, 13. 
65 I will discuss later why this is not necessarily an option for many undocumented migrants. 
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deterrence policy, the logic is that those outside the UK are aware of the hostile 
environment, know what they are getting themselves in for, and therefore should they 
enter and subsequently suffer its effects, the UK is not breaching any legal obligations.  
However, crucial here is the concept that those outside the UK are aware of the 
effects and are making a rational calculation. According to Pickett and Roche, the theory 
behind deterrence relies on two fundamental assumptions: First, that “individuals weigh 
the perceived costs and benefits of crime66 before offending, and then they choose to 
offend after calculating a net benefit of crime”; And second, that “there is a correlation 
between the actual (or the objective) risk of apprehension and punishment and 
individuals’ subjective beliefs about the risk of apprehension and punishment.”67 This is 
to say that the logic of deterrence borrows heavily from rational choice theory: 
Individuals will make a rational cost-benefit calculation about whether to commit a 
prohibited action, and will decide to withhold that action where the risk of being caught 
and the severity of the punishment outweigh the potential gain to be had from 
committing that crime.  
However, as Nagin points out, “the conclusion that crime decisions are affected 
by sanction risk perceptions is not a sufficient condition for concluding that policy can 
deter crime. Unless the perceptions themselves are manipulable by policy, the desired 
deterrent effect will not be achieved.”68 This means that a deterrence policy cannot 
                                               
66 Pickett and Roche wrote about the criminal justice system specifically, but their work has relevance to 
all forms of deterrence. 
67 Justin Pickett and Sean Roche, “Arrested Development: Misguided Directions in Deterrence Theory and 
Policy,” Criminology and Public Policy 15, No. 3 (2016): 727-751, 728. 
68 Daniel Nagin, “Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century,” Crime and 
Justice 23 (1998): 1-42, 5.  
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merely assume that ‘more severe punishments equals more deterrence’, unless we 
further build into the policy a means of affecting the way people perceive the 
punishment. I may very well be deterred from entering a country if I know that I will be 
denied access to non-emergency healthcare- but if I do not know that this is a potential 
punishment, then it will not factor into my decision-making process.  
My research therefore has important ramifications for the concept of the hostile 
environment as a human rights issue. For the notion of deterrence policies as pre-
emptively affecting decision-making relies on migrant agency and informed calculation. 
If a government prioritises its domestic political agenda over the goal of deterrence, and 
in doing so does not take all reasonable steps to spread news of the deterrence policy to 
audiences outside of its territory, then those who might wish not to experience the 
hostile environment will not be given a fair chance to avoid it. As one former asylum 
seeker told me, “[I]f I had known I’d be in this condition...I would have not come here at 
all.”69 I will argue that the provisions in the hostile environment have not sufficiently 
been broadcast to the target audience, will not affect the target audience in the way that 
the logic of deterrence implies, and furthermore the government should be aware of 
this, therefore there are significant doubts to which it can work as a deterrent policy.  
While some may point to the notion of the hostile environment as a policy 
designed to induce those already living with undocumented status in the UK to leave, I 
argue that given the words of Theresa May, the chief architect of the policy, that “ we 
don’t want...a situation where people think that they can come here and overstay 
                                               
69 Interview with Nigerian migrant, 11 May 2018. 
 27 
 
because they’re able to access everything they need”, this policy has at least in part a 
deterrent intention, and therefore the concerns brought up here apply to a significant 
number of individuals whom it affects. A deterrence policy that has no reasonable 
prospect of deterring entry, demonstrated at the very least through a credible 
information campaign to raise awareness and increase perception of its provisions, is 
deterrent in name only, and subsequently a government cannot be absolved of its 
human rights responsibilities merely by calling it a deterrent. 
 
 
5. How Do We Judge The Role And Intention Of A 
Policy? 
5.1 The problem with using outcomes as an indicator of intent 
There is a famous story- perhaps an urban legend- from colonial-era India, that 
says that the British authorities were at one point experiencing an epidemic of 
venomous cobras. In an attempt to be rid of these pests, they started offering a small 
financial reward each time someone presented to the authorities the body of a cobra that 
they had killed. For a while, this policy worked well, with Indians catching and killing 
cobras, and the British paying them for this service. After a short while, however, 
enterprising locals realised that they could simply breed the cobras themselves, kill 
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these snakes, bring their bodies to the authorities, and make huge profits. Eventually, 
the British authorities cottoned on to what was happening and, not having any way to 
distinguish wild cobras from bred cobras, were forced to abandon the scheme. The local 
cobra-breeders now had no reason to keep the snakes, and released them into the wild. 
Thus, a policy that was created to reduce cobra numbers ended up leading to a vast 
increase in their population.70  
What this story shows is that a bad policy is not necessarily demonstrative of a 
competing or alternative priority, and that outcomes do not necessarily indicate 
intentions. In the case above, the British authorities truly did want fewer snakes in 
India- the fact that they chose to pursue this goal with an ill-thought-out, 
counterproductive strategy tells us nothing about the role and intention of the policy 
they implemented. As Bovens et al note, “policy scientists have documented time and 
time again that policy makers fail to accomplish their objectives; that policies can have 
serious unintended effects”.71 
When analysing immigration policy then, I will try, as much as feasible or 
practicable, to avoid forming my judgements based on outcomes. Whether a specific 
policy does indeed reduce immigration does not necessarily mean that reducing 
immigration was the primary purpose of that policy: A policy to raise money for the 
Treasury by turning 90% of the UK into a toxic waste dump would likely lower 
                                               
70 Dale Hartley, “The Cobra Effect: Good Intentions, Perverse Outcomes,” Psychology Today, 8 October 
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71 Mark Bovens, Paul Hart, and B. Guy Peters, Success and Failure in Public Governance- A Comparative 
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immigration rates, but this does not make it an immigration policy per se. Likewise, 
there are situations in which a particular restrictive policy actually leads to more 
migrants coming, a la the ‘cobra effect’: For example, Cherti and Finch found that for 
some Nigerians, tightening of visa restrictions by the UK government was causing 
frustration, making them think that legal channels of migration were impossible, and 
subsequently convincing them to pursue irregular channels instead.72 
This approach also prevents issues arising from cases where two phenomena 
have opposite effects or cancel each other out. Suppose a government wanted to reduce 
irregular migration by restricting access to healthcare, and this caused 5,000 potential 
migrants to actively, reflexively decide not to come. But what if the country experienced 
a concurrent economic boom, making it more appealing, leading to 10,000 different 
migrants deciding to enter? In reality, the government’s policy was a success, and in the 
counterfactual scenario where it was not implemented, net migration was 5,000 higher; 
but if we focus on raw numbers, this is very hard to see. The myriad factors that make 
up a state’s immigration policy regime means that simple raw arrival number data tells 
us little about the role and intention played by any policy considered in isolation.  
 
                                               
72 Cherti and Finch, “No Easy Options,” 72.  
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5.2. A Procedural Approach to Policy Analysis 
5.2.1. The Policy Wheel as an Idealised Form of Policy Making 
Therefore, when analysing these policies, my focus will be more concerned with 
procedure than outcome per se. To do this, I will be focusing on how the British 
government ordinarily creates effective policy. One former senior civil servant told me 
that when creating new policies, ministers will set broad direction, outlining what they 
would like to happen in terms of achievement and attainment, and then effective policy 
will be created primarily by civil servants through adherence to the ‘policy wheel’.73  
 
                                               
73 Interview with former British civil servant, 26 June 2018. 
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The policy wheel contains six portions:  
1. Objectives  





The objective is perhaps the simplest part: Officials ask themselves, “What are we 
trying to achieve?” Targets are set, largely reflecting the direct orders from the ministers 
themselves. These guide all subsequent action: As the interviewee told me, the target to 
reduce net migration “coloured everything we did.”74 
Then, officials review the current situation, asking, “What is preventing us, within 
the current paradigm, from achieving those objectives?”75 Identifying barriers allows for 
better policy creation. It may be that legal or executive institutions are lacking, or they 
may be existent but being implemented inadequately.  
Having identified the gaps in the current regime, one then undertakes research to 
try and resolve them. This may involve reading academic papers or examining case 
studies from other countries to see what other ideas have been suggested or 





implemented elsewhere to solve similar problems, or it may involve consultation with 
stakeholders who have knowledge of the area under consideration.  
Once the officials have a strong grasp of the issue area at hand, they come up with 
solutions. These could be original, but they are often copied from academic research or 
other countries’ existing practices.  
After this follows the implementation stage, where a policy will be rolled out, 
either universally or as part of a pilot scheme.  
Finally, extensive review will be undertaken, to ensure that the new policy is 
effective at meeting the goals outlined in the objectives. Then, the process repeats- 
either starting from scratch if the policy fails, or building on prior success where 
relevant. 
 
5.2.2. Criticisms of the Policy Wheel as an Accurate Depiction of Policy 
Making 
Some may argue that this view of policy making is too simplistic- That it fails to 
appreciate how policy challenges today are, to use Rittel and Webber’s terminology, 
“wicked” problems (in contrast to “tame” ones).76 Rittel and Webber argued that prior to 
                                               
76 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 
4, No. 2 (June 1973): 155-169. 
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the 20th century, policy makers were tasked with solving pretty basic social problems, 
which would tend to have simple solutions. This created an illusion that policy problems 
could be solved by the scientific method, with policy makers seeing a problem, 
strategising how best to solve it in the most efficient way, then evaluating the success of 
this measure. 
However, as society progressed, it “became more heterogeneous and pluralistic in 
terms of culture, values, concerns and lifestyles, and this made public policy problems 
‘wicked’, i.e., lacking clear and widely agreed definition and objectives, and having many 
stakeholders with different and heterogeneous problem views, values and concerns.”77 
These wicked problems “do not have clear and widely agreed definitions and objectives 
that can be adopted as criteria for evaluating possible solutions.”78 This is to say that 
wicked problems cannot be understood as having ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ solutions, 
merely good or bad ones within a given subjective value system.79 Everyone will have 
different opinions on the cause of a problem, and different opinions on the best 
solution.80 To Rittel and Webber, then, the policy wheel would be nothing more than a 
rhetorical tool, adopting the pretence that policy is made through the scientific method, 
but ignoring the fact that the social problems of today will rarely have an ‘ideal’ solution 
derived from logical assessment of facts and methodical calculation of cause and effect. 
                                               
77 Enrico Ferro, Euripidis N. Loukis, Yannis Charalabidis, Michele Osella, “Policy making 2.0: From 
theory to practice,” Government Information Quarterly 30, Issue 4, (October 2013): 359-368, 360.  
78 Ibid.  
79 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 162. 
80 Ibid, 161. 
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Hallsworth offers empirical evidence that compounds Rittel and Webber’s 
arguments and gives reason to reject the idea that the policy wheel is a guiding force in 
British policy making. Through interviews with civil servants, he argues that the model 
does not reflect how policy is created in reality: Policy does not evolve in discrete stages- 
rather problems and solutions often emerge together;81  Policy making is often reactive, 
with news cycles being as much a reason to adopt a policy at a certain time as a rigorous 
framework;82 And the effects of policies are often indirect, diffuse, and take time to 
appear, meaning the evaluative mechanism will not give the full picture.83 
 
5.2.3. The Importance of Evidence Based Policy Making in the British 
Context 
While the above criticisms have validity, I want to resist departing from at least a 
vague conception of the policy wheel’s spokes when analysing government policy. To 
understand why, it will be prudent to delve deeper into British policy making in the last 
two decades. 
When Labour came to power in 1997, they implemented a number of civil service 
reforms that firmly entrenched the concepts of Evidence Based Policy Making (EBPM) 
                                               







and so-called ‘auditing culture’.84 This involved a commitment to utilising as much 
evidence as possible throughout the process, the thinking being that this would lead to 
better policies and outcomes.85 Auditing culture involved setting targets and then 
implementing an increasing number of tests and assessments to ensure that these 
targets were being met.86 Although there were some changes when the Coalition 
government took power in 2010, a firm commitment to EBPM remained.87  
Andrews (himself a former minister in the Welsh administration) notes that a 
variant of the aforementioned policy wheel is still official Treasury guidance, and goes as 
far as to say that “in practice, proof of evidence is largely normative now in 
governmental policy-making and requirements of proof of evidence are built into the 
processes of government.”88 Since “stubborn persistence, relentless monotony, attention 
to detail and glorying in routine are vastly underestimated in the literature on 
government and political history,”89 Andrews argues that a fixation on the rare cases of 
evidence-free policy making, without studying routine and consistent patterns of 
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behaviour, disguises the fact that policy makers utilising evidence is largely standard 
practice even today.90 
Given the ubiquity of EBPM in British government, and the fact that it is a stated 
aim of the system, it would be foolish to assert that the policy wheel method of analysing 
good governance should be disregarded entirely. The revelation that the Home Office 
had ‘deportation targets’ serves as evidence that even in the field of immigration, targets 
and monitoring form a basis of policy making.91 The criticisms outlined certainly have 
validity, but only in terms of specificities in the creative process. For example, one could 
argue that immigration is a ‘wicked problem’- with different stakeholders, interest 
groups, and minorities differing on what they perceive to be the issues, the solutions, 
and acceptable courses of action. But once the value-paradigm has been chosen by the 
policy maker, Rittel and Webber do not necessarily advocate for a departure from a 
method of policy making that relies on evidence, scrutiny, targets, and auditing- merely 
that what these stages consist of will differ depending on the stated aims, which are 
subjective. The criticisms listed by Hallsworth might in fact be demonstrative of a 
deficiency in the system, rather than a reason to reject this mode of analysis completely. 
Depending on the reason for the departure from EBPM, this may in fact reinforce my 
argument. 
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5.2.4. Intentional policy as good policy 
Even if we acknowledge limitations in theory and in practice with the policy 
wheel, appreciating that it represents an idealised form of policy making that may not 
necessarily encapsulate an exact reflection of reality, a good policy must still have a clear 
end goal, an identifiable conception of the causal mechanisms that need to be invoked to 
bring about that end goal, and a method of determining the extent to which that end 
goal has been achieved. Without these, we do not have a rigorous and well-planned 
policy- we have wishful fantasy. 
When trying to judge the balance of a policy between genuine targeted outcomes 
and cynical electioneering then, it will be prudent to establish the extent to which it can 
fit within this framework: If a policy is serious about its aim to reduce net migration, we 
would expect to find evidence of planning, quality research to ensure success, and 
extensive review. It is along these key axes that I will assess the extent to which the 
hostile environment displays attributes of a well-devised and well-executed policy 






6. The Theoretical Framework: Political Marketing, 
Symbolic Policy, And Legislative Output 
6.1. Political Marketing: Parties as Brands 
Having established a standard for assessing the degree to which a policy appears 
well-planned and geared towards a specified goal, we also need to determine signs that 
this is not the case, and explore the reasons why a party may implement policies that 
have an alternative priority to the one stated: In short, how and why would parties adopt 
policies to win votes rather than bring about the stated target?  
Retaining a focus on the concept of political marketing will allow a clearer picture 
of how governments use policy to appeal to voters. Hughes and Dann define political 
marketing as “a set of activities, processes or political institutions used by political 
organisations, candidates and individuals to create, communicate, deliver and exchange 
promises of value with voterconsumers, political party stakeholders and society at 
large.”92 It must be remembered that while many principles of corporate marketing can 
be applied to political marketing, and while on a theoretical level there are parallels to 
be drawn (e.g., the fact that political parties ‘compete’ to ‘sell’ their vision to the 
                                               
92 Andrew Hughes and Stephen Dann, “Political Marketing and Stakeholder Engagement,” Marketing 
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electorate), due to the fundamental differences between political parties and business, 
political marketing can only make sense with an understanding of political science.93  
Implicit in Hughes and Dann’s definition however are some important 
assumptions that are crucial for my analysis. First, borrowing from the world of 
commercial marketing, Hughes and Dann liken voters to consumers, who exchange 
their “time, effort, votes or cash” for “direct value”- that is, outcomes that are in their 
interest or perceived interest.94 Even in the 1960s, Kotler and Levy were noting that 
political “candidates are marketed as well as soap.”95 In this sense then, political 
campaigns are based on a paradigm similar to a commercial market transaction: 
Candidates and parties present their best qualities, try to convince the electorate how 
they will improve their lives, and also argue why they are a superior ‘product’ to their 
rivals; The voterconsumer, if suitably convinced, will ‘buy into’ this vision- albeit 
exchanging their vote rather than any cash.  
A further notable aspect of Hughes and Dann’s definition is that the act of 
marketing itself is based on more than running some adverts or coming up with a 
memorable logo. It comprises “a set of activities, processes or political institutions.” A 
political party can brand itself not just by the running of political adverts, but by the 
rhetoric of its members, the way it approaches certain policy issues, and the way it 
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responds to the policies of its rivals. In short, how a party markets itself encompasses 
not simply its immediate aesthetical endeavours, but its actions and structures too. 
This observation has practical relevance when we consider the tactics that the 
Conservatives might use to brand themselves as the party tough on immigration. Adams 
et al found that, far from electorates taking keen note of a party’s individual policies 
(such as those contained within a manifesto), a party’s policy changes from one election 
to the next did not affect the way that party’s political position was viewed on a left-right 
axis, it did not cause its supporters to adjust their own left-right self-identification, and 
it did not cause voters to abandon one party for another that more closely aligned with 
their own left-right allegiance: In short, they found very little evidence that a party’s 
policy pledges in the run up to an election affected voter behaviour in any meaningful 
sense.96  
What they found instead was that “voters react strongly to their perceptions of 
parties' Left-Right shifts but not to parties' actual shifts”97 (emphasis added). For 
example, political commentator Stephen Bush notes that current labour leader Jeremy 
Corbyn is viewed by many of the ‘New Labour’ faction in the party as a left-wing radical, 
while many of his supporters viewed his predecessor, Ed Miliband as too right-wing to 
support, despite their policy agenda being identical on a host of the most important 
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issues.98 This shows that the way leaders present their issues matters a great deal- 
Corbyn has empowered more youthful strains of the party, embraced trade unionism, 
and used confrontational rhetoric when addressing corporate interests, things that 
Miliband was more hesitant to do.  
The findings of Adams et al therefore indicate that to see how the Conservatives 
might use immigration policy as a political tool, we need to look beyond explicit pledges 
in the manifestos. Within the 2010 manifesto, there is scant reference to specifics of 
immigration policy beyond the pledge to cut overall levels, which would back up the 
notion that this is not the means by which the party is looking to cultivate its brand.  
Adams et al stress that their “findings do not support the sweeping conclusion 
that European political parties cannot make successful policy based appeals to voters,”99 
just that this policy appeal will most likely not be based off those specific policies 
contained in manifestos. Erikson et al show that legislative activity is an effective, 
policy-oriented method of influencing voter behaviour.100 A party that votes in favour of 
lots of immigration policy will be viewed as taking immigration seriously, regardless of 
the content of that policy.  
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6.2. Symbolic Policy Making 
Slaven and Boswell argue that it is common to view policy making in the field of 
immigration- and especially in the field of irregular migration- as ‘symbolic’: using 
“cosmetic policy adjustments to signal values and intent, rather than substantive 
measures to steer the object of intervention.”101 They note that often these policies are 
more an ‘expressive’ form of political intervention than an ‘instrumental’ one: “While 
instrumental interventions are consciously aimed at steering the behaviour or effects of 
target populations [in this case irregular immigrants], symbolic or expressive 
interventions are designed to signal to an audience that the government is committed to 
certain values or goals.”102 Furthermore, they do not deny that symbolic policy making 
may produce “substantive effects...on the populations that are identified as the object of 
such interventions”, merely that they primarily serve to “signal commitment to the 
audience, rather than to affect the object of intervention.”103  
Why would governments do this? Slaven and Boswell identify three main 
theories: Manipulation, compensation, and adaptation.  
A theory of manipulation suggests that governments adopt symbolic policies to 
affect political narratives, either to portray themselves in a positive light, or by making a 
certain issue more emotive so that there will be more public support for subsequent 
policies addressing it. As Sears says, “Controlling the public agenda is required in order 
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to control the symbolic meaning of an attitude object [be that a political party or a policy 
target]. Such control is politically consequential both in influencing overall public 
support for the object and in influencing which [emotional] predisposition it evokes.”104  
Compensation is the act of using symbolic policy making to disguise 
counteractive instrumental policy. While a domestic public may demand more 
restrictive immigration policy, interest groups, client politics, economic factors, moral 
considerations, and legal barriers may all prevent a government from pursuing such 
restrictions in practice.105 Therefore symbolic policies may be implemented to assuage 
public fears about immigration, while policy in practice remains expansionary.106 
Adaptation involves adopting policies that may sit well with the public, in spite 
of a policymaker’s better judgement. It may be the case that a political party has a 
genuine desire to reduce immigration, but that “public demands are not just for 
‘restriction’ generally but for specific types of interventions,” that may appear logical to 
the public, but in reality diverge from what the policymaker understands would truly be 
most effective.107 Therefore symbolic policy serves as a signalling mechanism, to 
indicate to voters that their specific concerns are being addressed, even if that differs 
from policy that would have substantive instrumental effects.  
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Given Theresa May’s well-documented “obsession” with reaching net migration 
targets,108 it is obvious that the Conservatives are not pursuing symbolic policies to 
disguise more liberal actualities of immigration. And given long standing public opinion 
against immigration which predates the Conservatives’ tenure, as well as restrictive 
immigration policies emerging coincidentally with a rise in UKIP’s support levels, the 
adaptive model seems more likely than the manipulation model. I would argue that the 
Conservatives adopt policies that may not make total sense causally or logically, but 
appeal to a public sense of what ought to be done.  
Marsh argues that in different cultural and historic contexts, societies’ definitions 
of what constitutes a crime are related to what they perceive as a threat within their 
particular social setting, and they will legislate accordingly, regardless of the objectivity 
or actuality of such concerns across different social contexts.109 As the general 
population increasingly perceives undocumented migration as a societal threat, there 
becomes increasing pressure on legislatures to criminalise it and implement new laws to 
emphasise this criminalisation. This pressure exists independently of the objectivity of 
the threat, which explains why politicians may be so willing to follow the adaptive model 
of symbolic policy making: The policies created address the constructed threat rather 
than objective reality. That is to say that if, for example, the public perceives that 
immigrants represent a threat to services such as the NHS, the government will want to 
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take measures to address this, to publicly reassure voters, despite the fact that evidence 
shows the threat to be overstated.110 
Adopting symbolic policy rather than instrumental policy also makes sense given 
the specifics of the UK context and voter demographics. I have already stated how part 
of the reason why the Conservatives adopted more restrictive immigration policies has 
been the threat of far-right encroachment, especially that of UKIP. If we take UKIP’s 
vote share as a proxy indicator for anti-immigrant sentiment,111 then we see that it is 
highest where there are the fewest immigrants.112 There is also data to suggest that the 
public believes that a quarter of the population are foreign-born, when in reality the 
number is closer to 13%.113 Where the public’s estimation of a certain population’s 
prevalence in society is overstated by nearly 100%, and where the people who demand a 
policy response are those who have the least contact with the target group, then it is 
reasonable to suggest that the British public’s perception of immigration levels and 
impact will not be perfectly responsive to changes over time. Would a 1% reduction in 
migrant stock be noticed by a public who are already overstating the population by 
nearly 100%? This is to say that a government can most likely achieve as much electoral 
success by addressing migration symbolically, giving the impression that something is 
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being done, as they could by implementing practical measures with demonstrable 
outcomes.  
 
6.3. The Theoretical Framework Stated  
Combining these observations together, a theoretical framework emerges. The 
hostile environment represents a bundle of policies that are presented to the electorate 
as part of the Conservative’s ‘brand’, to market their party, with the hope that voters 
who share an aversion to immigration will prefer the Conservatives to their rivals. While 
reducing numbers may be a goal, the seemingly endless raft of new laws, regulations, 
and executive instructions may be indicative of a party trying to cultivate an image of 
being harsh on immigration that appeals to public sentiment. What this means is that 
while the Home Affairs Select Committee may criticise “the complexity of the 
[immigration] rules and the frequency with which they change”114 (for example, during 
her tenure as Home Secretary Theresa May implemented 45,000 changes to the 
Immigration Rules)115, this may be a deliberate tactic by the government. In order to 
create an image that the Conservatives are the party committed to being tough on 
immigration, it is important that the news cycle is regularly filled with stories about the 
Conservatives taking new steps to tackle the ‘problem’. This necessitates frequent, and 
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increasingly complex and intricate, immigration rules to be created, regardless of their 
likelihood of success: What matters is the public’s perception that something is being 
done. In this sense then, the hostile environment represents symbolic policy making: 
While reduction of immigration may be a goal, it is far more important to create policies 
that appeal to public sentiments and give the impression that their specific concerns are 
being addressed.  
In the following chapters I look to investigate this theory by examining the hostile 
environment in more depth. 
 
 
7. Is The Hostile Environment A Departure From What 
Came Before? 
I have previously noted how, to some extent, the Conservative’s stance on 
immigration was influenced by a desire to stand in contrast to the Labour government’s 
at the time.116 Regarding the theoretical framework outlined above, it is crucial that the 
Conservatives market themselves as being tougher on immigration, and churn out 
legislation to support this image. But to what extent does the hostile environment 
actually mark a qualitative- as opposed to a merely rhetorical- shift away from policy 
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that came before? If the Conservatives adopt policies indistinguishable from those of the 
previous regime, but market them differently, this may indicate a conscious 
prioritisation of public image. In other words, to what extent is the hostile environment 
symbolic? 
For all the condemnation of the hostile environment by Labour MPs, during Blair 
and Brown’s tenures many near-identical policies were in place, either introduced by 
their governments, or at least not repealed.  
The ability to charge non-permanent residents for healthcare was introduced in 
the NHS Act 1977 and subsequently consolidated in the NHS Act 2006.117 What the 
Conservatives have changed is to apply these rules more stringently, and introduce an 
executive mandate to check eligibility for non-emergency healthcare prior to treatment, 
rather than afterwards, and refuse to instigate if necessary. Of course, this has huge 
implications for someone who might prefer acquiring debt to an untreated tumour, for 
instance. But in terms of actual entitlement, the Conservative government has changed 
very little.  
Regarding employment law, the Immigration Act 2016 introduced a criminal 
offence of illegal working, which, among other things, allows the government to 
confiscate wages as ‘proceeds of a crime.’118 Yet from the employer’s end, while the 
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Immigration Act 2016 toughened civil sanctions for employing undocumented workers, 
and lowered the burden of proof required for an employer to be criminally liable,119 the 
substance of the law- that employers are required to check that workers have 
documented status before employment begins- is a measure introduced in the 
Immigration Act 2006,120 while the classification of the employment of undocumented 
migrants as a criminal offence dates back to 1996.121 
Other parts of the hostile environment are little more than rhetorical flourishes, 
not substantive new policy. For example, in 2012 David Cameron announced plans to 
publish the nationality of benefits claimants for the first time, a move employment 
minister Chris Grayling attributed to a need to curb “benefit tourism.”122 Admittedly this 
was accompanied by piecemeal restrictions of benefits entitlements for EU nationals, 
although this is a group with no right to claim benefits without prospect of future 
employment anyway. But the report actually confirmed that foreign-born people living 
in the UK made up just 6.4% of total claimants, were less than half as likely as British 
nationals to claim benefits (7% of the total population versus 17%), over half of those 
‘foreign born’ had become British citizens before claiming benefits (not to mention those 
who had regularised their stay through other means), and just 2% were not found to 
definitely have the right to claim benefits (although this could equally be attributed to 
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incomplete data or administrative mistakes).123 Non-EEA nationals with temporary 
leave to remain, and especially undocumented migrants, have no right to claim benefits 
in the first place. While restrictions to EU migrants’ benefit entitlements are conceivably 
one way of reducing net migration, EU migrants (even those from the so-called EU-8 
countries that ascended after 2004) are net contributors to the UK, and evidence 
suggests that welfare is not a driving factor in migration from the EU.124  As David 
Cameron tried to negotiate further restrictions of migrants’ benefit entitlements in the 
run up to the 2016 EU Referendum, Portes commented that, “no serious analyst, inside 
or outside the UK government, thinks the impacts will be significant,” noting 
furthermore that the British government had by its own admission failed to collect data 
demonstrating what impact EU nationals had had on the benefits system.125 This meant 
that the Conservatives had no real idea whether the ‘problem’ they were trying to 
address even existed.  
What are we to make of this then? Given the general impotence of welfare 
restrictions on EEA arrivals numbers, plus the fact that non-EEA migrants cannot claim 
benefits until they have permanent residency, then why publish the nationalities of 
benefit claimants? The mere act of publication achieves nothing, other than to single 
one group out for inspection, sow division, and draw attention to further welfare reform, 
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while playing on public fears of migrants abusing the benefits system126. This seems like 
a clear example of the government giving the appearance of doing something, while in 
fact enacting minor policies: They know such policies will either not achieve anything, or 
have not even carried out proper investigation to determine whether they are necessary. 
This clearly aligns with Slaven and Boswell’s conception of ‘symbolic policy making’ as 
“cosmetic policy adjustments to signal values and intent, rather than substantive 
measures to steer the object of intervention.”127 If the public has constructed a threat in 
the form of migrants, especially undocumented migrants, abusing the benefits system, 
then any policy even vaguely addressing this will appeal to voters, even if it achieves 
little in a practical sense.  
The hostile environment has indubitably made life more difficult for 
undocumented migrants, both in theory and in practice. But many of its provisions are 
mere extensions of policies already in place. Is the hypothetical migrant who comes here 
with the express intention of claiming NHS treatment going to be put off by the 
knowledge that they will have to prove entitlement before treatment, if the prospect of 
insurmountable debt was not a factor beforehand?128 For a small business owner, if a 
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potential £10,000 fine per worker is not enough to dissuade them from deliberately 
turning a blind eye to a hiree’s immigration status, will a £20,000 fine change their 
mind?  
Of course, the government may be relying on marginal gains. Sure, some 
employers are unscrupulous and will break the law to hire undocumented migrants 
whatever, and many migrants will have forged documents to allow them to bypass right-
to-work checks. But perhaps there are at least some employers for whom the extra 
potential fine will affect their decision. But I maintain that this is an extension of 
existing policy, and not a brand new direction as the name “the hostile environment” 
would suggest. Returning to my theoretical framework, it seems that the government is 
seeking to create a reputation for cracking down on undocumented migrants, by taking 
existing legislation, remoulding it in superficial ways or extending it to its logical 
conclusion, and rebranding the whole endeavour “the hostile environment,” to imply 
some radical paradigmatic shift. In many regards, hostile environment measures are all 
things that one could imagine the previous Labour administration implementing (and 
indeed, in many cases, they did just that). What has changed is the way that the 
Conservative government has presented them under a unified, anti-immigrant banner, 
affecting the party ‘brand’ and influencing public perception of those policies. To this 
end, it does not matter if the evidence shows, for example, that undocumented migrants 
represent a fraction of those seeking NHS treatment- It matters that the government can 
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be seen to be constantly creating new, innovative ways to deal with the ‘problem’, 
regardless of how big that problem is to begin with.  
 
 
8. The Problem With Measurability 
8.1. The Hostile Environment’s Effects Can’t be Measured 
An obvious claim that can be levelled against the hostile environment as a 
genuine instrument for affecting change in immigration levels, is that it does not fit into 
the civil service’s own model for a successful policy. As we have seen already, good 
policy requires a clear goal, a clear strategy of how to achieve that goal, and a feedback 
mechanism, to see results and adapt the policy as needs be.  
If we are to give the British government the benefit of the doubt, and take the 
hostile environment at face value, then the first aspect of this process- the clear goal- is 
self-evident: The election pledge to ‘“take net migration back to the...tens of thousands a 
year, not hundreds of thousands,”129 and additionally to reduce irregular migration.  
I will address later the extent to which the hostile environment employs clear 
strategies that have a realistic chance of success, but immediately an issue arises with 
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the final part of the policy wheel: How can one assess and evaluate a policy aimed at 
reducing irregular migration, which, by definition, cannot be measured? 
When it comes to calculating the numbers of undocumented migrants in a state, 
“the exact figure is obviously impossible to determine.”130 Estimates of the 
undocumented population in the UK are extremely varied: A study in 2005, using 2001 
census data, estimated there may be 430,000 irregular migrants resident in the UK, but 
with upper and lower bounds of 570,000 and 310,000 respectively.131 An updated report 
taking into account potential population changes in the six years afterwards returned a 
central estimate of 618,000, with upper and lower bounds of 863,000 and 417,000.132 
This is to say that, within the same study, depending on the extent to which certain 
assumptions hold, the predicted number present may vary by as much as 446,000: And 
nobody knows for sure. One former Liberal Democrat staffer told me, “We’re not even 
capable of accurately measuring the number of people who enter and leave the UK 
officially through ports; how can we hope to accurately determine the number who 
might come in and out under the radar?”133  
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From a policy perspective, this is worrying. How can one define the success of a 
policy, much less assess, reassess, and change the course of said policy, if the starting 
numbers and ending numbers are indeterminate? At what point could Theresa May 
confirm that the policy had achieved its goals? At what point does it stop? Even if the 
Home Office somehow found a way to accurately measure the irregular population in 
the UK today, and found it to be exactly 500,000, how would we know whether the 
policy had worked? Depending on the starting population (which was indeterminate), 
this might mean that the hostile environment had successfully reduced the 
undocumented population by as much as 363,000...but it might also mean that it raised 
the population by 83,000, or had no effect at all! 
Earlier in this thesis, I said that I would largely avoid judging the role and 
intention of the hostile environment through a consequentialist lens- I would avoid 
making analyses based on outcomes. One may think then that it is hypocritical to 
suppose that a limitation of the hostile environment as a legitimate policy tool is its 
indeterminate outcomes. But in this case, the actual outcome itself is irrelevant: What 
matters is the principle that the outcome, whatever the outcome, cannot be measured. I 
would not say that a reduction in arrival numbers from, say, 50,000 a year to 20,000 a 
year is any more indicative of a genuine policy commitment (as opposed to a case of 
pandering to a hostile domestic public) than if arrival numbers instead rose to 80,000: 
But the fact that the Home Office is physically incapable of telling either way indicates a 
policy that cannot realistically be assessed, evaluated, and critically examined: That is to 
say, at the most generous reading, it is a hopeful wish more than a firm commitment to 
the goal of immigration deterrence. By way of analogy, suppose the government planned 
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to raise childhood literacy by 5%, and opted to utilise some vague and fantastical scheme 
(perhaps giving every child a free dictionary), but did not bother to measure literacy 
rates before, during, or after. At the next election, if they then touted their strong 
commitment to childhood literacy, we would have good reason to be sceptical of this 
claim, and moreover sceptical of the extent to which the government truly believed that 
their policy had had a realistic chance of success, rather than being performative in 
nature. It is hard to see how any of the measures contained in the hostile environment 
could have been created in good faith using the policy wheel, since a crucial component- 
the review stage- cannot possibly be performed.   
 
8.2. Resisting Review 
Some may accuse me of being unduly harsh in this criticism. As I have already 
noted, the exact undocumented population can never truly be determined. If we say the 
only good policy is a measurable one, does that mean that a government must simply 
never tackle issues such as undocumented migration, since it can never accurately 
determine success?  
The first thing to note is that at times the government has not only resigned itself 
to a lack of measurability, but actively resisted measurability. The Home Office has not 
published an official estimate of the number of undocumented migrants in the UK since 
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the 2005 report previously mentioned.134 This study was not perfect (using the ‘residual’ 
method of calculation, taking the total number of foreign-born respondents in the 2001 
census and subtracting those known to have legal status), but it at least represented a 
starting point; an attempt to gauge the scale of the issue, which should form the 
backbone of effective policy making. The Conservative government, in contrast, has 
never commissioned a similar report, but has not hesitated to use bad data to legitimise 
their policies. When cracking down on “bogus colleges”, May justified her stance by 
citing figures from the Office of National Statistics (ONS), which estimated that 100,000 
international students overstayed at the end of their visas.135 However, in 2017 the 
estimate was revised, based on new exit check data, and demonstrated that in fact only 
5,000 overstayed:136 The initial rhetoric had been based on a 2000% overestimation of 
the problem. We might be tempted to attribute this to poor quality of available data at 
the time, rather than any ulterior motive, but this seems more like wilful ignorance than 
an honest mistake: Portes remarked that the limitations of the data used by the ONS 
were well-known: “[May] knew at the time that this was a stupid policy based on bad 
data.”137 Former Liberal Democrat minister David Laws later recalled being told by a 
senior civil servant, “Theresa May is saying that entry and exit checks would be 
expensive and embarrassing,”138 showing that the government resisted review precisely 
because evaluation of the policies would not vindicate their success. It seems here then 
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that rather than a well-meaning policy that faced certain statistical limitations, May 
chose to actively eschew measures which could have led to a more accurate picture of 
the immigrant population, and thus, better policies.  
Of course, governments are often forced to adopt policies of which the outcomes 
cannot accurately be measured. But given the well documented commitment of the 
British government to EBPM, we would still expect, in the absence of measurable 
outcomes, some form of research or analysis that would indicate these policies likely to 
work. Indeed, in 2010, then-immigration minister Damian Green proclaimed, 
“[W]hatever your stance on immigration, if you are not basing policy on decent evidence 
you will be likely to fail.”139 In reality, however, it seems clear that at many points in the 
process of designing the hostile environment, political expediency has taken precedence 
over substantive and rigorous EBPM. For example, in August 2012, the government 
suspended London Metropolitan University’s license to sponsor visa applications, a 
move intended to show that they were cracking down on ‘abuse’ of the system- but this 
was a hasty decision, taken just a few weeks before the start of term, leaving 2,000 
students visa-less in limbo, and the decision was eventually overturned in court 
anyway.140 The timing of the decision (close to the start of term when student migration 
would be a salient issue, but not early enough to actually dissuade applicants) combined 
with a failure to consider strategy or consequences, suggests political opportunism 
rather than a genuine, well-planned policy. Likewise, the ‘deport first, appeal later’ 
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policy implemented with the 2014 Immigration Act was pushed through, despite the fact 
it might actually represent an increase in costs, as the government would have to fund 
return travel to those whose appeals were successful.141 
The British legislature itself accepts that this is a disturbing aspect of the hostile 
environment. In November 2017, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and 
Immigration, David Bolt, testified in front of the Home Affairs Select Committee- the 
premium Parliamentary body tasked with scrutinising and assessing various 
government policy regarding home affairs, including immigration. In his oral evidence, 
he stated that “a problem with the...hostile environment...is that the Home Office does 
not have in place measurements in order to evaluate the effectiveness of those 
provisions.”142 He further expressed that what he would have expected to have seen by 
now is some evidence that the hostile environment is working, “so that there is some 
justification for the two pieces of legislation [the Immigration Acts 2014 and 2016] and 
for all of this effort that is being put into this by a whole variety of people.”143 Bolt’s 
concerns were later adopted by the Committee in its final report, where additional 
concerns were expressed that, not only were there no criteria for measuring the 
effectiveness of the hostile environment, but that two obvious candidates for 
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measurement- numbers of enforced and voluntary returns- had in fact decreased in the 
time period.144 
The lack of oversight and evaluative reports alone does not definitively prove 
specifically that the government cares more about appealing to domestic audiences, but 
it does cast aspersions on the idea that these policies were implemented with a genuine 
belief that they could realistically succeed. Given the well-documented antipathy in the 
British public towards immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants, it seems at 
least plausible that a government may care more about implementing a policy, any 
policy, that appears to be tackling the issue, regardless of whether that goal can be 
tangibly assessed.  
 
8.3. Issue Conflation To Create a Sense of Action 
A further degree to which the motives of the hostile environment may attract 
suspicion, relative to issues of measurability, lie in the conflation of the hostile 
environment with the government’s wider immigration targets, which can be measured 
(to an extent). A Home Office report from 2012 said that tackling irregular migration 
was “central” to the target of reducing net migration numbers.145 If this is in reference to 
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the government’s 2010 electoral pledge (calling for net migration to be reduced from 
hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands), then this is patently false. Irregular 
migrants simply do not factor in to the net migration figures, and so they cannot 
possibly affect them.  
The use of issue linkage to achieve political objectives and obfuscate outcomes is 
a well observed phenomena in the area of migration management. Breuls notes how in 
Belgium, emphasis was placed on policies to target the removal of those specific 
undocumented migrants who had criminal records, thereby creating a rhetorical link in 
the public consciousness between undocumented migration and crime: Not only was 
this used to justify further clamp downs on immigration, but it also allowed the 
government to claim migration policies were succeeding when crime statistics 
improved.146 
Acknowledging the theoretical framework I am analysing these cases against, this 
makes sense. I posited that the government is concerned primarily with pumping out 
legislation to give the impression that they are being tough on immigration, regardless 
of whether immigration is actually being tackled. Conflating the hostile environment 
(the success of which is totally unmeasurable) with the more formal net migration target 
allows the government to create a false sense of something being done: If net migration 
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does come down, the Conservatives can argue that their policy is working, even though 
the scope of these policy areas are completely different.147  
 
 
9. Demographics and Motivations 
9.1. The Make-up of Undocumented Inflows 
A look at why undocumented migrants come to the UK suggests that the hostile 
environment, even were it widely known, would not act as a deterrent pre-entry, and for 
a substantial number would not induce them to leave. If the government were truly 
committed to tackling undocumented migration, they would pursue alternate policies 
that take this into account.  
I noted earlier that Finch and Cherti, drawing on Papademetriou, identify five 
categories of undocumented migrant: Undocumented entrants; Fraudulent entrants; 
Visa violators; Visa overstayers; and Refused asylum seekers. Analysing these groups 
will reveal the extent to which the hostile environment has a realistic chance of success. 
If it can be shown that these policies will be impotent, then it casts serious doubts as to 
the extent that they were well-planned and with a serious expectation of success. 
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I choose to group the first two categories, undocumented entrants and fraudulent 
entrants, together. While acknowledging that there are qualitative differences between 
and within these classifications, in both cases an entrant to the country has used 
deceptive means to bypass a border guard. Additionally, in both cases, unlike the other 
three cases, there is less scope to argue that they ‘do not know what they are doing’- 
these two categories of undocumented migrant represent perhaps the most flagrant 
abuse of border measures.148  
If we analyse the hostile environment as a deterrent measure, then we might 
expect this group to be the prime audience. As a demographic who have made an active 
choice to enter the country clandestinely or deceptively, we would imagine that they 
have done their research, and made an informed choice to come to the UK. Therefore, 
policies that make the UK unappealing, comparative to other countries in Europe or 
their country of origin, would affect this decision-making process.  
However, this group is estimated to make up no more than 20% of the UK’s 
undocumented stock: As Finch and Cherti point out, “The irregular immigrant who has 
suffered great hardship and put him or herself in great danger to enter the UK 
‘clandestinely’ is not the norm.”149 With this in mind, we might expect that even if the 
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hostile environment is immensely successful at reducing immigration by this group, the 
impact it will have on total inflows will be modest.150  
Visa overstayers and violators represent by far the largest category, with Cherti 
and Finch estimating the number at about 60% of the undocumented population.151 
When Theresa May said, “What we don’t want is a situation where people think that 
they can come here and overstay because they’re able to access everything they need,”152  
it is clear that to a large extent the hostile environment was aimed at stopping these 
people from overstaying in the first place (i.e. encouraging them to leave before they 
joined the undocumented population), but undeniably the main way this policy was 
intended to affect this group was by inducing to leave those who have already 
overstayed. 
The final category, refused asylum seekers, is not an insignificant demographic. 
Although the numbers fluctuate annually, in any given year, roughly between 25-40% of 
those who make an asylum claim will have their claim refused, and will not be known to 
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have left the country (either voluntarily or through deportation).153 With 258,145 total 
asylum applications in the UK between 2010 and 2017,154 this indicates an estimate of 
103,258 refused asylum seekers who have come to the UK just since the Coalition 
government came to power and are now living with undocumented status, not to 
mention those who have been present for far longer.  
The discourse around migration in Europe has for over two decades 
distinguished between ‘genuine’ refugees and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, the former being 
in real need of international protection, the latter merely economic migrants looking to 
opportunistically enter Western states among refugee waves, but fleeing no conflict, 
violence, or persecution.155 It is clear that the Conservatives share this distinction, and 
the hostile environment is to some degree aimed at keeping out those deemed to be 
making supposedly spurious applications- Theresa May told the Conservative Party 
conference in 2015, “the fewer people there are who wrongly claim asylum in Britain, 
the more generous we can be in helping the most vulnerable people in the world’s most 
dangerous places.”156 The hostile environment serves therefore to deter from entry those 
viewed as making false asylum claims, as they will face a harsher life when their case is 
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ultimately rejected. Furthermore, for those already in the UK, the hostile environment is 
an incentive to leave and return to their country of origin.  
It is worthy of note that the rejection of an asylum claim does not necessarily 
make that claim “bogus”: It may be indicative of a lack of substantive evidence, a 
stubborn Home Office official, or the psychological effect of trauma leading to narrative 
inconsistencies at the application stage.157 Additionally, there was outcry when it 
emerged that a third of asylum applications had been made by people already living with 
undocumented status in the country after being picked up by enforcement officials. 
Many thought that this indicated that a large number of applicants were opportunistic 
and fraudulent.158 But many migrants may simply not know the intricacies of the asylum 
process, or dangerous conditions in their home country might have manifested after 
they entered the UK. Two brothers I interviewed had been living with undocumented 
status for nearly a decade. They came to the UK on visitor visas, before political issues 
back home prevented their return. They therefore overstayed their visa, but due to 
circumstances outside of their control, their solicitor simply did not submit their asylum 
application.159  Their claim is now being processed, but before the mistake was realised 
they would have been counted as ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, or simply visa overstayers. 
This story is also indicative of the fact that not everyone who overstays their visa enters 
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the country expecting to do so, casting doubts on the hostile environment as a deterrent 
mechanism for this group.  
Indeed, closer examination of the motivations of undocumented migrants 
undermines the accepted wisdom that there is a qualitative difference between genuine 
refugees and other inflows of undocumented migrant. It also seriously undermines the 
view that the hostile environment will lead to great success.  
 
9.2. Why do Undocumented Migrants Come to the UK? 
The decision to come to any given country is the result of a combination of push 
and pull factors: Push factors being those issues that induce one to leave one’s country 
of origin, and pull factors being things in a destination country that draw migrants to try 
and settle there. 
Finch and Cherti, for example, found that fleeing persecution and conflict was the 
fourth most common reason given by undocumented respondents as to why they chose 
to leave their home country, with 17% citing it as a major reason (and not all of those 
claimed asylum at the border).160 During my own interviews I spoke to one man from 
Sudan, who had first claimed asylum in Ireland and been refused: He came to the UK, 
not to claim asylum again (he told me that he knew this would be impossible), but rather 
because he was simply out of options. There is a significant population of 
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undocumented migrants in the UK who will not be induced to return by the hostile 
environment, nor will be put off coming in the first place, because it is preferable to the 
harm that they will face in their country of origin. Migrants may also flee hardships, 
including extreme poverty, that might not meet the criteria for formal legal asylum, but 
represent an instance of forced migration nonetheless.161 
Finch and Cherti also emphasise that economic factors comprise a key reason for 
undocumented migration, with 40% of respondents saying that they came to the UK 
primarily to earn more money, 12% saying low earnings in their home country was the 
main reason, 11% blaming unemployment, and 8% citing poor career prospects. The 
hostile environment has potential to affect this group, although a case can be made that 
there will always be a motivation for individuals to continue to immigrate just so long as 
economic opportunities, even for undocumented workers, are greater in the UK than in 
origin countries.162  
*** 
We also need to consider not just why migrants may want to leave their country 
of origin, but why they choose the UK specifically.  Again, prevailing evidence in the 
literature does not indicate that the hostile environment is likely to be efficacious.  
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The first thing to note is that for those who would come under the categories of 
clandestine entrants or refused asylum seekers, the notion of a “pull factor” is somewhat 
redundant anyway. McAuliffe and Jayasuriya posit that migrants exist on a “continuum 
of agency”, trying to maintain as much control of their lives as possible, but in reality 
being beholden to external factors.163 Often migrants find themselves subject to the will 
of smugglers, or will be forced to adapt their plans dynamically in response to 
developments en route.164 For these migrants, the hostile environment is not going to 
factor in to their decision making, as the decision is not theirs to make.  
That said, where migrants are able to exercise agency, empirical evidence 
suggests that some factors are more important than others in determining destination 
choice. Thielemann, using asylum flows as a proxy for “unwanted migration”, found 
little correlation between deterrent policies and application numbers, concluding that 
the strength of the economy, historic migration patterns between countries, shared 
language, and colonial ties were more important.165 Using qualitative interviews, 
Crawley found that for those crossing the Mediterranean during the recent refugee 
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crisis, the presence of family members in a country was of far greater importance than a 
specific country’s asylum or immigration policies.166 The logic behind this is obvious: 
People will want to go where they have the best chance of fitting in and thriving- 
Understanding the language, the culture, and being around family and friends will be 
key to that process, as will entering a country where the economy is booming, with 
ample opportunities for self-advancement. This is to say that migrants will be attracted 
to the UK because it is a top industrial nation, and boasts large immigrant communities- 
these factors will not be changed by the hostile environment.  
There are some important caveats to the above analysis however. It may be true 
that “richer destination countries receive a higher per capita share of asylum seekers”,167 
and this is not something the government can or should want to change. But the hostile 
environment may affect migrants’ perceptions of their ability to participate in, and 
therefore enjoy the benefits of, a strong economy. Nevertheless, within diaspora or 
social networks, it is relatively easy for migrants to bypass right-to-work checks, 
whether that be because of compatriots giving them cash-in-hand jobs as a favour, or 
through the forgery of documents or the borrowing of friends’ legitimate documents.168 
Where social networks between origin and destination countries are strong, the costs of 
migration are lower, as diaspora communities will be able to provide information, 
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assistance, and emotional support, therefore there is more incentive to migrate.169 In the 
next chapter I will analyse in more depth how messaging by both the government and 
social networks undermines the ability of the hostile environment to have an effect, but 
for now it will be enough to mention that where social networks remain a key 
component of migration flows, the ability of the hostile environment to deter entry will 
rely on overcoming these barriers. 
An additional caveat is that a country’s general ‘friendliness’ or ‘liberalness’ 
towards migrants and asylum seekers acts as a pull factor,170 while there also exists a 
negative correlation between electoral performance of far-right parties and destination 
choice.171 Therefore policies that are specifically designed to make the UK a ‘hostile 
environment’ for undocumented migrants may entice those migrants to try their luck in 
more liberal northern European states. However, these caveats are dependent on the 
realities of the hostile environment being known to would-be migrants through 
messaging, an issue I will explore in more depth in the next chapter.   
Furthermore, this form of analysis may not apply to those migrants coming to the 
UK with visas. However, if we follow the Conservatives’ logic, and conceive of visa 
overstayers as people who have made a rational choice to come to the UK and 
deliberately overstay in order to live in the country irregularly, then the motivations may 
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be similar- deliberate visa overstaying being just another, more drawn-out, way of 
evading a border check. Of course, we have seen that not all visa overstayers come to the 
UK expecting to overstay. 
*** 
The hostile environment relies on a specific logic, that aims to reduce 
undocumented migration through deterring entry and inducing exit. Such thinking 
borrows heavily from rational choice theory, suggesting that the decision to enter or 
remain in a territory is based off of a logical calculation of net benefit to the individual, 
relying on impartial assessment of objective conditions.172 The hostile environment 
assumes that the procedurally relevant criteria that a migrant will base their decision to 
enter or stay on are largely economic (access to housing, employment, etcetera). Aside 
from issues of incomplete information, competing priorities, and so forth, this ignores 
the myriad non-economic reasons why migrants choose to leave home and settle in 
foreign countries, especially emotional or affective reasons.173 As Ryo says, “The view of 
would-be migrants as atomistic, utility maximizing opportunists diverts our attention 
away from the complex and wide-ranging moral systems within which prospective 
migrants are embedded.”174 Du and Li found in China that emotional responses based 
on subjective assessments of social realities were more important in migrant decision-
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making than cognitive evaluation of evidence.175 In the context of the UK and the hostile 
environment, this is to say that a policy that relies on merely restricting access to a range 
of economic opportunities and services is unlikely to be successful when migrants have 
established lives in the UK and conceive of it as home. One Congolese migrant told me 
that he had always considered his stay in the UK as a short term way to get money, but 
had reconsidered and decided to stay after his girlfriend became pregnant.176 A Ugandan 
woman told me that despite facing immense hardships since arriving, “If I compare the 
type of life I was living there and here I feel like I would rather be here. I am more happy 
here.”177  
Further, policy makers believe that those who reside in a country irregularly have 
made a rational choice to break the law, by weighing the benefits of disobedience against 
the risks. But such thinking fails to explain why, if this is a mindset adopted by 
undocumented migrants, such people are not more likely to break the law in other walks 
of life, where to do so might accrue benefits.178 Ryo, taking Mexican migration to the US 
as a case study, found that individuals who self-declared as likely to attempt to cross the 
border irregularly, were more likely to agree that individuals had a right to break unjust 
laws, and were more likely to believe that the US had no right to restrict immigration 
from Mexico.179 In the context of the UK this is prescient, with Finch and Cherti finding 
that many undocumented migrants they spoke to, some of whom had been working 
productively and contributing to society for a number of years, believed that they were 
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morally justified resisting return in a system they believed to be unfair.180 I found this 
attitude to be common among the migrants I spoke to, with one Congolese man telling 
me, “All people are the same…[a visa] is just a paper...if you’re paying tax, there [should 
be] no problem. We’re living underground but still we’re paying tax.” Therefore, in many 
ways, the excessive harshness of the hostile environment may do more harm than good, 
hardening attitudes of migrants and giving them more justification to resist the 
system.181 
When we consider the ability of the hostile environment to induce emigration, it 
is also worth remembering that some undocumented migrants will have accrued large 
debts to smugglers in order to get to the UK182- the hostile environment is unlikely to 
persuade them to leave before they have raised enough money to pay this off. 
Furthermore, many who travel for economic reasons do so as a result of pressure to 
send remittance back to their family, and it is almost seen as a rite of passage, especially 
where a ‘culture of migration’ has developed:183 Finch and Cherti quote an IOM worker 
in China who summarised it by saying, “If you are not going, you are not ambitious – 
and if you return without money, you are a failure.”184 In both these cases, economic and 
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social factors exogeneous to the hostile environment will limit the effectiveness of its 
provisions. 
As previously mentioned, the hostile environment is seemingly based on 
assumptions about the motivations and demographics of undocumented migrants, but 
those assumptions are misguided. In reality, fewer undocumented migrants than 
expected enter clandestinely, and while access to economic opportunities are a factor in 
motivating migration, there are myriad social and emotional components at play, 
including family ties, shared language, a sense of belonging, and historic connections. 
Indeed, Finch and Cherti found that 75% of respondents had absolutely no intention of 
returning to their country of origin any time soon despite the hardships resulting from 
the hostile environment, even though they acknowledged that it was getting harder to 
work and instances of deportation were perceived to be increasing- Less than 10% had 
plans to leave within one year.185 40% had intentions to stay permanently, and for those 
who wanted to eventually return, they expressed a desire to do so “when they had 
achieved targets for accumulating money or reaching personal goals.”186 The hostile 
environment will not remove the push factors that cause people to leave origin countries 
in the first place, it does little to dissuade them from choosing the UK over alternatives, 
and its logic does not cohere with the mindset of undocumented migrants, making 
voluntary emigration unlikely.  
                                               
185 Cherti and Finch, “No Easy Options,” 12.  
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The UK perhaps accepts this, recognising the need to provide developmental aid 
to other countries to mitigate against the structural causes of irregular migration.187 
And, perhaps acknowledging that once undocumented migrants are within the UK they 
are unlikely to actually leave voluntarily (despite this being one of the main purposes of 
the policy), the government has, with less public fanfare, ramped up border controls, 
including outsourcing so-called ‘juxtaposed’ border checks to France and Belgium, using 
technology to identify clandestine entrants stowed in vehicles, and implementing carrier 
sanctions, to name but a few.188 Meanwhile, voluntary returns, and enforced removals, 
which might represent perhaps two of the biggest indicators available for the success of 
the hostile environment policies specifically, have fallen in recent years.189 The 
continued implementation of the hostile environment despite evidence that its 
provisions will lack efficacy, while alternative measures (such as border checks and aid 
donations) are pursued in a less public manner, serve to reinforce Boswell and Slaven’s 
theory of symbolic policy making as an adaptive mechanism; here we see a clear 
indication of a government identifying and implementing measures which might 
actually work, but nonetheless relentlessly pursuing less efficacious policies that cohere 
more with the public’s conception of what will be effective. This seems to suggest that 
the hostile environment itself is a performative mechanism, designed to appeal to 
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10. The Failure Of Messaging 
10.1. External Messaging 
As previously mentioned, a main role of the hostile environment is as a 
deterrence policy. As Hagen-Zanker and Mallett elucidate- 
“Governments want these policies to ‘send a message’. They focus on amplifying 
that message as loudly as possible, so that people thousands of miles away – 
people who might not have even started their migration journeys – are able to 
hear it. This approach operates on the assumption that by transmitting 
negative signals and messages, governments can change someone’s mind about 
migrating, at least to a particular place.”190 
                                               




But what if the evidence were to show that governments do not in fact amplify that 
message “as loudly as possible”? What are we to make of these so-called ‘deterrence 
policies’ then? 
Using messaging to spread deterrence policies to other countries is nothing new. 
In 1972, as many Ugandan Asians attempted to flee persecution from the regime of Idi 
Amin, Leicester City Council took out an advert in the Ugandan Argus newspaper.191 The 
advert told Ugandans that housing waiting lists were long, public services stretched, and 
school places scarce192- in short, coming to settle in Leicester was a bad idea. As it 
transpired, the advert was unsuccessful, with former Leicester councillor Lord Bach 
telling BBC’s Today Programme in 2013, “It was actually almost an advertisement for 
people to come.”193  
More recently, as millions of migrants have crossed the Mediterranean into 
Europe since 2011, governments have been reaching out into origin countries to 
dissuade them from coming. In 2015, the German embassy in Afghanistan ran 
campaigns on social and traditional media to warn of the risks of travelling to Europe;194 
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Denmark also broadcast its refugee policies in Lebanese newspapers that year;195 
Belgium has in the last decade run awareness campaigns in 16 different countries.196 
Such awareness campaigns are a crucial element in a deterrence policy. As I 
argued previously, a deterrence policy without a credible effort to ensure affected parties 
are aware of the negative repercussions of non-compliance is deterrent in name only. If 
a state wants to argue that they are within their rights to withhold duties and obligations 
from undocumented migrants, on account of the fact that those migrants have 
knowingly violated explicit rules, then migrants must be aware that the rule existed 
beforehand. Suppose I decide to migrate to the UK with the sole intention of getting a 
job: A policy that restricts my access to the labour market might act as a deterrent, but 
only if I am aware of it.  
The UK’s has not pursued effective information campaigns to the same extent as 
other countries. In November 2016, the European Migration Network published the 
results of an ad hoc enquiry into the use of information campaigns by EU 
governments.197 The question asked was, “Have your national authorities ever 
implemented any information and awareness raising campaign targeting prospective 
migrants and asylum seekers in their countries of origin or in country of transit towards 
the EU?”198 While Belgium has run 23 campaigns in 16 countries, and the Netherlands 
                                               
195 Ibid, 2. 
196 European Migration Network, “Summary of EMN Ad-Hoc Query No. 2016.1100: Migration 
information and awareness raising campaigns in countries of origin and transit,” European Commission, 
November 2016, 1.  
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has run five campaigns targeting 28 different countries, the UK in its response only 
listed one campaign, targeting Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The British response to the 
report explicitly refuses to elaborate on the contents of this campaign, and as we will see 
there have been some other efforts made to reach migrants outside of the UK, however 
this initial response does not indicate a government taking all reasonable steps to warn 
potential migrants of the hardships that face them if they choose to violate the UK’s 
borders.  
The government has made some alternative efforts to reach migrants in countries 
of origin, including collaborating with the Foreign Office and targeting local media. For 
example, the UK worked closely with the Vietnamese authorities on an information 
campaign to highlight the risks of irregular migration, including the production of a TV 
documentary.199 In South Asia, the UK Border Agency and Foreign Office commissioned 
a film, interviewing returned migrants, to show the downside of irregular migration to 
the UK, which was shown in different locations.200  The Foreign Office also helped the 
Kenyan state broadcaster insert an immigration-related storyline into a popular East 
African soap, ‘Makutano Junction’, which has 20 million viewers.201 The government 
collaborated with the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo on the 
production of a television programme called ‘Tose Mibeko’ (meaning ‘Play by the 
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Rules’), broadcast on six channels on Congolese TV as well as in cinemas, theatres, and 
schools.202 
Information on the content of these campaigns is hard to find. Therefore it is 
hard to tell what aspects of British immigration policy they are highlighting or 
emphasising. It is also hard to tell the extent of their reach or impact. The Home Office 
itself admits that “it is difficult to directly evaluate the effectiveness of these 
measures.”203 If we return to the subject of measurability, we would expect the 
government to have undertaken some form of analysis as to whether such campaigns 
are reaching the audience in the best possible way. As it stands, we are left to conjecture 
the extent to which a potential migrant would truly be discouraged from entering the 
UK based on the plotline in a fictitious TV programme. One Congolese migrant told me 
that his only knowledge of the UK prior to entry was basic facts and history he had 
learnt at school; He said that only rich people were able to access more comprehensive 
and up-to-date information, undermining the view that targeted campaigns, even within 
specific countries, are truly taking all steps to reach audiences.204Additionally, many of 
the campaigns examined above were launched before the provisions of the hostile 
environment took effect. It is unclear whether similar campaigns have been launched 
specifically to address hostile environment policies.205   
                                               
202 Cherti, “Does Immigration Enforcement Matter?.” 
203 Toms and Thorpe, “Practical Measures for Reducing Irregular Migration,” 30. 
204 Interview with Congolese migrant, 11 June 2018.  
205 In the course of researching this thesis, I made a Freedom of Information Act request to determine 
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One aspect of information campaigns that can be examined is a leaflet entitled 
“Your Stay in the UK”, which has been given to every visa applicant since 2011 and is 
intended to ensure visa compliance.206 This leaflet very briefly outlines the need to pay 
for NHS treatment, and the punishments for working illegally, but it is scant on 
enforcement information, and cannot in any reasonable sense be expected to form part 
of a comprehensive deterrence campaign.207 
When we consider the hostile environment as immigration deterrence, and how 
information campaigns play into this, an important matter to remember is that, as 
previously discussed, many migrants coming to the UK adapt their plans dynamically en 
route, and may not have chosen the UK until events along the journey forced them into 
contingency plans. Therefore, while the UK may have taken some limited steps to run 
small campaigns in specific origin countries, the fact that the Home Office “do not run 
broad public facing campaigns to spread information about the UK’s immigration 
policy”208 is a worry. I can find no evidence that the Home Office publishes press 
releases, or policy announcements, in any language besides English, making it unlikely 
that a non-English speaking migrant in transit would be able to find up-to-date 
information from official sources.  
Given that migrants are increasingly using social media and the internet to obtain 
information about destination countries in transit,209 I wanted to investigate whether 
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the government was using this medium to broadcast messages about the hostile 
environment. I examined the Facebook pages for the British consulates in India210, 
Pakistan211, Bangladesh,212 and Nigeria213 over a four month period from 1 May 2018 
until 1 September 2018. While it is hard to determine the exact national make-up of the 
undocumented population in the UK, I chose these four as the countries with some of 
the highest numbers of nationals in immigration detention,214 taking detained 
population to be an approximation of the total undocumented population.215 Although 
Albania and China both have a higher detained population than Nigeria, the Albanian 
consulate Facebook page is in Albanian, while the Chinese page posts too infrequently to 
be of analytic use (perhaps reflecting the lack of Facebook use in China). I therefore 
chose the aforementioned countries as examples of places where the UK government 
would be most interested in targeting a deterrent message to effectively reduce 
migration, while also being possible for me to analyse. I chose to study the consulate 
Facebook pages as these give the best indicator of the message that the British 
government wants to broadcast to each country. I specifically chose not to focus on 
domestic government departments (for example, the Home Office), under the 
assumption that a migrant in transit who might not speak English would turn to the 
                                               
210 British High Commission New Delhi, “UK in India”, Facebook, 
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consulate page for their own country first.216 I also chose this to determine whether the 
UK government was mirroring information campaigns undertaken by the German 
Embassy in Afghanistan, for instance.217 
My findings were revealing. In the entire four month period I examined, in which 
a total of 481 posts were made by these pages combined, not one pertained to the hostile 
environment. This is not to say that migration was not addressed: In India, for instance, 
out of 145 total posts, 27 promoted Britain to some degree or encouraged foreign 
nationals to visit, while 19 posts provided information on how to obtain a visa or 
scholarship to come to the UK. Many of these posts in fact spoke of how easy it was to 
get a visa, with a few pointing to the fact that nine out of ten applications were accepted 
last year. While we may argue that encouraging legal routes to migration is necessarily a 
counterweight to undocumented migration (directing some who may try to enter 
irregularly to apply for a visa instead), in order to work as a deterrence policy, potential 
migrants need to be aware of the risks of the hostile environment.  
There are a couple of counterpoints here. First, the four month period under 
examination is two years after the last Immigration Act was passed, and three years 
after the peak of the ‘migrant crisis’. It is possible that during both of these periods, 
where the issue of tackling undocumented migration was more prescient, that more 
public information campaigns were executed. 
                                               
216 Even though I acknowledge that the examples I chose are all English-speaking, I wanted the results to 
be applicable to non-English speaking contexts. This again relies on an assumption that British consulates 
in different countries will post similar content to one another. Although I found there to be some 
difference in content between pages I studied, the general messaging was similar enough to support this 
conclusion. 
217 Oeppen, “Leaving Afghanistan! Are you Sure? ͛.” 
 85 
 
Second, one might argue that the purpose of the embassy is to promote the 
country abroad, and therefore it is unlikely that it would overtly broadcast information 
about cruel government policies.  
However, I argue that this entirely reinforces my point. An embassy’s job is to 
promote the agenda of the country in question, as well as to influence how that country 
is perceived by the world. The Facebook page for the consulate in Nigeria, for instance, 
posted frequently about British initiatives to help advance disability rights. In 
Bangladesh, there was a focus on Britain’s leading role in providing aid to Rohingya 
refugees. If the UK’s embassies choose not to disclose the hostile environment, that is 
because that is an aspect of Britain that the government does not want those outside the 
country to be aware of. While I accept that in the past, more explicit information 
campaigns may have been run, I wanted to simulate the experience of a migrant 
choosing to come to the UK today: If the hostile environment were really intended to be 
as pervasive and constant as the government says, we would expect the messaging to its 
target audience to be just as consistent.  
 Ampfolo et al posit that European governments are hesitant to provide 
information about immigration policies online to avoid being seen to encourage further 
immigration,218 leaving an information vacuum.219 But the alternative to providing this 
information is to abdicate responsibility for ensuring those outside the country are 
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aware of the hostile environment before they are exposed to it. One South Sudanese 
asylum seeker told me that he encountered no source of official information about the 
UK before he arrived in Calais.220 While the government may be hoping that 
information reaches migrants through unofficial routes and via private social networks, 
this cannot be guaranteed, as there exists a “technology gap” between both old and 
young, and rich and poor,221 and unofficial information channels can also be unreliable 
sources.222 The most likely explanation for this information vacuum is that the 
government is simply not prioritising those outside of the UK in its messaging regarding 
the hostile environment. This undermines the notion that the goal of deterrence is being 
actively pursued, instead suggesting that these policies are for the consumption of 
domestic audiences.  
 
10.2. Internal Messaging  
Where the government has taken steps to broadcast information about the hostile 
environment, however, has been within the UK. But the nature of these campaigns 
raises questions about the extent to which migrants themselves are the intended 
audience of the hostile environment.  
In 2013, the Home Office launched the infamous ‘Go Home’ vans, which toured 
parts of the UK with the message that undocumented migrants should “Go home or face 
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arrest”. The Home Office acknowledges that only 11 people voluntarily returned as a 
result of this campaign.223 This was part of a wider initiative, Operation Vaken, which 
included running adverts in eight minority ethnic newspapers and placing postcards in 
shop windows- Again, the success of this was limited, with only 60 people voluntarily 
leaving the UK.224 Given the findings of Chapter 9, it seems unlikely that migrants with 
strong personal reasons for remaining in the UK (e.g. family, relationships, economic 
reasons, etc.) would be induced to leave simply due to a billboard telling them that they 
might face arrest- This is something that they are already aware of. The public nature of 
this campaign, combined with its ineffectiveness in influencing migrant decision-
making, suggests that the government cared more about providing a clear, visual 
message to the domestic audience that they were doing something, regardless of 
whether this something had any effect.  
Similarly, posters have started appearing in hospital and surgery waiting rooms, 
informing undocumented migrants that they have no right to healthcare. But given that 
memoranda are already in circulation requiring health workers to check documentation 
prior to commencing non-emergency treatment, these posters seem hardly necessary- 
They do not affect the ability of migrants to access treatment. However, by again making 
this campaign public-facing, permeating public space with messages emphasising 
restrictions against migrants, the government appears to be doing more to reassure the 
public that steps are being taken, without really affecting the migrants themselves.225  
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The government, in its internal messaging, has sought public-facing campaigns 
that have been shown to have limited effect. Of course, we must acknowledge that where 
a target population’s location is unknown, often public-facing campaigns are the only 
way one could hope to reach an audience. But the content is also important: The 
campaigns tell migrants nothing that they are not already aware of. To this end, they 
appear performative. They seek not to inform migrants of government enforcement or 
legislation, but to instead signal to domestic audiences that the government is cracking 
down on undocumented migrants.  
 
11. Conclusions 
This thesis is not intended to imply that the government does not care about 
reducing inflows. Indeed, for a party that has pinned its reputation on its tough stance 
to immigration, a repeated failure to meet the ‘tens of thousands’ target has been a 
perennial embarrassment.226 But if we look at where the Conservatives’ priorities lie, it 
is clear that at times the government has expressed a preference for politically expedient 
options that will appeal to public sentiment and promote a reputation for being tough 
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on immigration, even if this comes at the expense of well-planned and well-executed 
policy.  
The fact that the hostile environment contains many provisions identical or 
derivative from measures introduced by previous governments does not alone show that 
deterrence is not the primary objective. But it does imply that the title ‘hostile 
environment’ is more an exercise in political marketing than a radical new policy 
direction.  
Likewise, in an environment where EBPM is the norm, the Conservatives have 
implemented policies without comprehensive estimations on the scope of the issue to be 
tackled prior to instigation, or rigorous assessment post hoc. When dealing with a 
problem as ambiguous or nebulous as the undocumented population of a country, it is 
of course understandable that governments will be forced to adopt policies that cannot 
be measured exactly. But they should be based on some sort of logic or evidence. Where 
statistics regarding the impact of the hostile environment exist, such as voluntary 
removals or deportations, they have not shown the hostile environment to be successful- 
and yet the policies persist. And rogue acts such as revoking London Metropolitan 
University’s visa-sponsoring license at an unfathomably inconvenient moment serves as 
further proof that the Conservatives are not just unfortunate in their inability to acquire 
evidence surrounding the hostile environment: They are actively resisting empiricism, 
and defying what a logical procedural approach would suggest.  
This is compounded by looking at who the hostile environment is meant to affect. 
While indeed a lot of undocumented migrants travel for economic reasons, for many the 
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economic reasons are ‘push factors’ from source countries as opposed to ‘pull factors’ 
towards the UK: This is to say that migrant outflows are not the result of some intrinsic 
attractiveness of the UK, but because conditions in Western Europe in general are seen 
as preferable to those in origin countries, even when living with undocumented status. 
For many undocumented migrants, the draw of the UK specifically is the existence of 
close cultural ties and family links, and this also represents a reason why they will not 
leave immediately, even as the government places more restrictions on them. 
Furthermore, a not insignificant number come via smuggling routes, or fleeing conflict 
and persecution, and so treating their decision to come to the UK as a genuinely free 
choice that can be affected by restrictive immigration policy is misguided. This is all to 
say that measures that seek to dissuade migrants from entering or induce those already 
present to leave are unlikely to be efficacious. However, if we study this strategy through 
the lens of an adaptive theory of symbolic policy making, it makes sense: The 
government is responding to public fears of the effects of immigration- in terms of 
threats to jobs, the NHS, housing supplies, and so forth- and implementing policies that 
assuage those threats, regardless of their effectiveness.  
Government workers themselves accept that the hostile environment is not 
backed up by a rigorous enforcement policy necessary to ensure success. Lucy Moreton, 
general secretary of the Immigration Service Union, told The Sun newspaper, “If you 
don't break the law, we are not going to get you as we don't have the resources. We can't 
catch you.”227 This shows that the government’s supposed opposition to immigration is 
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undermined by its own austerity agenda. Again, this demonstrates that the provisions of 
the hostile environment have not been backed up with the resources to guarantee 
success- It merely represents an appeal to what the public feel ought to be done. The 
consistent legislation pumped out ensures that the government appears to be taking 
immigration seriously, without the concurrent executive action needed to ensure it. 
Finally, we can see from the UK’s external communications that messaging to 
migrants extraterritorially is not a priority for the government. To this end, it is a 
mystery how those outside of the UK can reasonably be expected to be deterred by the 
provisions of the hostile environment. Messaging within the UK contains no effective 
content, arguably doing more to provide the public with reassurance that action is being 
taken.  
At this point, it is worth remembering that, within the context of my theoretical 
framework, the deterrent nature of the hostile environment stands in tension with the 
needs of the government to produce constant rafts of new legislation. While, from a 
symbolic policy perspective, this legislative output is necessary to show the British 
public that the government is taking action, it necessarily means overcomplicating 
immigration rules, and reducing the likelihood that potential migrants will be able to 
acquire knowledge on the full extent of the hostile environment- We saw in Chapter 6 
that the British legislature shares these concerns. 
The contrast with the case of Australia is stark. In 2014, Australia launched an 
information campaign video that stated, in no uncertain terms, that Australia was 
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committed to intercepting and returning all ships that entered their waters illegally.228 
Setting the severe human rights concerns regarding this policy aside,229 it at least 
represented a clear, simple, and unequivocal message that could not be misinterpreted. 
The same cannot be said of the hostile environment. The fact that the UK has chosen to 
prioritise extensive legislation over clarity of messaging serves as evidence that the 
deterrent nature of the hostile environment is subordinate to the pursuit of symbolic 
policy making.  
Of course, when we consider the limitations of messaging abroad, it is important 
to remember that the hostile environment serves a dual purpose: It does not seek purely 
to deter immigration, but to encourage emigration. If the government were to care only 
about the latter objective, then the lack of investment in messaging would not be a 
concern: Migrants need not know about the hostile environment before they come, so 
long as once they are here, conditions are bad enough that they are induced to leave.  
However, in Chapter 4 I explained how the government justifies severe breaches 
of human rights by pointing to migrant agency and rational choice: Migrants who do not 
wish to experience the hostile environment have a choice to avoid it. But this logic can 
only make sense within the deterrence paradigm: Without knowledge of the hostile 
environment prior to entering the UK, a migrant is unwittingly exposing themselves to 
human rights deprivations that they may not have done if the choice were made with 
perfect information. This is to say that even if we accept the right of a government to 
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neglect their duties and withhold entitlements in the face of territorial breaches, this 
cannot happen without an acceptance that the government has a duty to first inform 
those extraterritorially, even if the main thrust of the policies is not to deter entry per se. 
Of course, it may simply be that the government is cruel, and does not actually care 
about human rights: Perhaps they have lied about the deterrent nature of these policies, 
and in reality their only concern is inducing emigration. It would, however, be an odd 
assumption to suppose that a government that wants to reduce the undocumented stock 
in the UK does not care how many undocumented migrants enter the UK, and only 
cares about those who leave- Since for any population N who enter the UK, the number 
who can be guaranteed to leave later, even with the most comprehensive internal 
enforcement policies possible, will undoubtedly be <N. Given the rhetoric of senior 
ministers, it seems that the policies are ostensibly intended to have a strong deterrent 
component. With this in mind, a government truly committed to using the hostile 
environment to reduce the overall number of undocumented migrants in the UK would 
be expected to do more to utilise extraterritorial messaging.  
*** 
In 2018, something very interesting happened. After the resignation of Home 
Secretary Amber Rudd in the aftermath of the Windrush scandal, her replacement, Sajid 
Javid, announced that certain hostile environment measures would be temporarily 
suspended. Data would cease to be shared between certain government departments 
(including NHS Digital, the NHS’s online database recording patient information) and 
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the Home Office.230 This came in response to public polling that revealed that, although 
hostility to immigration remained at similar levels to previously, and support for the 
hostile environment was high, two thirds of the public believed that the government had 
mishandled the Windrush scandal.231 Russell Hargrave, a journalist and former Liberal 
Democrat staffer, summarised this by saying, “If you press people hypothetically on 
where they stand on immigration they will espouse tougher and tougher opinions, but 
when confronted with the reality of Windrush, the policies proved unpopular.”232 The 
public like harsh immigration policy in the abstract, but dislike seeing the human cost of 
this- A similar phenomenon occurred when photographs of Aylan Kurdi washed up on a 
Turkish beach greatly affected public opinion regarding migrant flows.233 
Why would the government withdraw these policies at this time? A simplistic 
answer may be that these policies were intended only to affect undocumented migrants: 
When the immunity of the Windrush generation could not be guaranteed, the 
government thought it better to be safe than sorry, and rescinded them. Yet this 
explanation is unsatisfactory when we consider that the Home Office knew for at least 
two years prior that the hostile environment was affecting this group:234 What changed 
is that the public found out. 
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This emphasises the findings in this thesis. Ultimately, the hostile environment is 
a nebulous and reactive set of policies, enacted more to appeal to public sentiment of 
what should be done, than as a legitimate pursuit of an ideological policy goal. Where 
public sympathy runs out, the policies are disposable. While the public remain opposed 
to immigration in theory and in abstract, the government has a lot to gain from 
churning out legislation, and taking a tough rhetorical stance, regardless of whether all 
efforts are made to enforce this or achieve the intended policy goals. While the stated 
goal is managing migration, the evidence suggests that the government cares more 
about managing public opinion. This is achieved through symbolic policy making, where 
the government implements ineffective measures that nevertheless cohere with the 
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